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ABSTRACT

The American states routinely adopt various economic development policies but those policies
do not always contribute to economic growth in the state. Scholars identify several reasons to
explain why the policies do not always work. First, policies that do not address market demand;
rather, provide economic incentives to bring inward industrial investments do not contribute to
economic growth because the cost it takes to create jobs by such industrial recruitments is too
high. Second, policies that are adopted out of inertia chosen from traditionally practiced policies
do not work because they are not evaluated for their effectiveness in terms of meeting the current
and future market demand. Third, policies that are adopted because neighboring or ideologically
congruent states adopt them do not work because the appropriateness of a particular policy may
not be the same in the pioneer and the follower states. These reasons imply that economic
development policies that are not new enough to meet the current market demand, that are not
helpful to promoting in-state entrepreneurship, that are designed to help out-of-state firms in
extending their branch-plants, and that are inappropriate in terms of the home conditions can be
ineffective for economic growth. I conduct empirical testing to examine these four expectations
and the results suggest that innovative economic development policies, entrepreneurial policies,
and policies that are congruent to the state’s industrial strength lead to economic growth, but
policies that are meant for industrial recruitments lead to leakage from the state’s economy.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Many scholars challenge the classical economics’ position that economic growth depends
on natural endowment, labor pool, and monetary and fiscal policies (e.g. Easterly and Levine
2003; Porter 1990, 2003). Rather, as some scholars argue, industrial productivity that results
from continuous innovation and upgrading determines economic growth (e.g. Porter 1990).
Political factors are associated with this innovativeness and economic growth because of two
human agencies – institutions and human capital (Easterly and Levine 2003; Gourevitch 2008).
While legal institutions can lead to economic growth by providing legal support in business
transactions and property rights (North and Weingast 1989), political institutions such as state
legislatures can facilitate superior economic and social outcomes because competition among the
office seekers pushes them to adopt better policies (Berkowitz and Clay 2012). Human capital
that is characterized by higher education and skills can also lead to economic growth by adopting
new scientific and technological means (Mokyr 1990). A government, therefore, plays an
important role in promoting innovation and economic growth by offering institutional supports
and funding education and training.
More specifically, economic growth requires government policies in sorting out how
capital investments will take place, and how efficiency in production will be maintained
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(Bensel 2000). In the United States, while the federal government deals with monetary policy,
and makes sure of non-interference with the market, the states and local governments are
actively involved in influencing the business environment and human capital by adopting and
funding various economic development policies (Jensen and Malesky 2018). Among those
policies, there are entrepreneurship-oriented policies that help businesses with developing
technical abilities and incentive-oriented policies that provide financial assistance to lure inward
industrial investments. Scholars find that entrepreneurial policies lead to in-state economic
growth because they promote using technology to utilize local resources and because they help to
increase local capital (Langer 2001; Turner 2003). On the other hand, the economic incentives
are ineffective for economic growth, and they are detrimental to innovation and a competitive
business environment because they are meant for targeted firms or branch plants that may bring
the capital back to where they originate from (Jensen and Malesky 2018; Langer 2001; Porter
1990; Turner 2003). Yet, many states keep offering economic incentives to lure inward
investments, but why do they keep offering such incentives even if they do not contribute to
economic growth?
There are electoral reasons for the politicians and there are systemic reasons for the state
government to keep providing incentives. Incentivizing to recruit firms creates immediate effects
in the electoral campaign of politicians by helping them to claim credit for creating jobs (Jensen
and Malesky 2018; Turner 2003). The systemic reasons include an inertia factor for which the
states keep doing what they have been doing and an emulation factor for which they tend to
adopt policies that other governments (state, city, or the federal) adopt (Gilardi and Wasserfallen
2019; Gray 1973; Jensen and Malesky 2018; Turner 2003). For states are laboratories of
democracy, a successful policy adopted by a state is followed by other states and similarly, an
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unsuccessful policy is avoided (Karch 2007). However, in the process of the evaluation of
policies as to whether they are successful or unsuccessful, the follower states might take too
much time and become slow to adopt the innovative policies. Therefore, policy innovation and
the diffusion of policies from one state government to another might play a role in economic
growth. Walker (1969) finds a correlation between policy innovation and the state’s richness but,
to my knowledge, there is yet no empirical examination whether the rate, time, and pattern of
policy diffusion have any impact on economic growth of a state. So specifically, I examine if the
innovation and the process of policy diffusion has any impact on economic growth. In other
words, my question is whether the governments that are more behind in adopting innovative
policies also fall behind in economic growth.
Although a fast adoption of successful policies can positively impact economic growth,
states make policy choices based on politicians’ own interests, which markedly influence the
course and speed of policy diffusion. Policy diffusion at the intergovernmental level happens
through four mechanisms: learning from success and failure elsewhere, competition for resources
such as industrial jobs, coercion for international/national pressure, and emulation for perceived
appropriateness of policies (Gilardi and Wasserfallen 2019). Policy contents are often misjudged
or wrongly applied at the issue definition and policy adoption stages. At the issue definition
stage, policies are not always taken for their effectiveness, rather for politicians’ perception of
the merit of the policy (Boushey 2010; Gilardi and Wasserfallen 2019). At the adoption stage,
politicians adopt policies that are congruent to their own ideological position and that have
electoral consequences in their reelections (Gilardi and Wasserfallen 2019; Karch 2007; Walker
1969). In both stages, state’s policy adoption is also influenced by the policy measures of the
neighboring states (Walker 1969; Wang 2018). However, the states that pioneer the adoptiont of
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a new policy can be more economically prosperous than the ones that follow the experience of
the pioneers (Walker 1969). With the most upgraded/innovative policies, the pioneer states can
support their competitive industries more effectively because surviving the competition requires
industries constantly developing their products and production processes (Porter 1990; Porter
2003). Similarly, the states that are slow to adopt new policies fail to remain competitive, and
consequently, remain slow in economic growth.
How can we characterize innovative and traditional policies? Can they effectively
contribute to a state’s economic growth? States adopt three main types of economic development
policies: demand side or entrepreneurial policies, supply side or industrial recruitment policies,
and deregulation or business climate policies. Generally, only demand side policies are found to
contribute to economic growth (Langer 2001; Leicht and Jenkins 1994). Demand side policies
such as research and development and export promotion contribute to the economy and decrease
income inequality because they advance technology, increase capital, and encourage
development to meet the demand of home and out-of-state markets (Jansa 2020; Langer 2001;
Leicht and Jenkins 1994; Porter 1990). Demand side policies are innovative because they are
adopted quickly in order to address the constant changes in demands. Being innovative, the
demand side policies can lead to economic growth of the own state because they help product
development and industrial processes in the home state to remain competitive to respond to the
changing market demands. In contrast, supply side policies such as corporate, excise,
income/property, and sales tax incentives do not bring economic growth but inequality because
these policies are aimed at luring targeted out-of-state firms. The cost of these incentives
becomes very high because firms’ location decision is subject to bidding among multiple states
(Jansa 2020; Langer 2001; Turner 2003). Moreover, economic incentives can be wasteful
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because firms make location decisions for fundamental economic reasons to optimize input cost,
transport cost, scale economies, shared resources, access to information, etc. (O’Sullivan 2011;
Porter 1990; Turner 2003). So, supply side policies that are made to serve branch plants and their
existing technologies are emulant ones and may not contribute to economic growth of the own
state because the revenue the out-of-state firms generate becomes a mobile capital and get leaked
from the economy of the host state.
Moreover, states may need industry specific economic policies because not all states
specialize in the same industrial sector. For instance, in terms of employment size of an industry,
Texas ranked first in the oil and gas production and transportation in 2017 while New York
ranked 28th, whereas New York ranked 2nd in the biopharmaceuticals sectors in the same year but
Texas ranked 10th (U.S. Cluster Mapping 2020). How does the government play a role in
maintaining the level of competitiveness and innovativeness of the economy that a state
specializes in? With incentivizing firms, governments insulate them from the pressure to
compete with foreign companies (Porter 1990). So these firms become slow to innovate and
eventually fail. Again, leaving everything on the market, including the promotion of
entrepreneurship, is also harmful because then companies tend to merge or create alliances to
monopolize the market, which also eventually hinders innovation in industries in the home
state/country (Porter 1990). However, entrepreneurial projects do not help the politicians to
claim credit because their impact is neither immediate nor as visible as the industrial recruitment
projects’ (Turner 2003). Again, a competitive industry takes decades to create the necessary
agglomerative forces in a geographical region; but in politics, a decade is a very long time.
Although politicians have limited incentives to make policies that support long term
entrepreneurial programs, suitable entrepreneurial policies specific to the type of industry can
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lead to an organic development of the business enterprises that may help the specializing
industries in the home state to grow and to remain competitive in the out-of-state markets.
This dissertation empirically tests whether policy innovation and quick adoption of
innovative policies lead to economic growth. I hypothesize that they should because innovation
and a quick adoption thereof happen to address a new market demand; and meeting the market
demand can lead to economic growth. I also test whether entrepreneurship- and incentiveoriented policies cause differing impacts on economic growth. I hypothesize that the former
should positively and the latter should negatively impact in-state economic growth. I expect so
because entrepreneurial policies support the local economy to grow from within and the revenue
the economy creates is reinvested within the state; whereas, incentives bring external firms to
take place of local businesses and allow locally generated revenue to move elsewhere for further
investment preventing the in-state growth. Finally, I test whether policies specific to a state’s
industrial specialization cause any positive impact to the economic growth. I hypothesize that
they should because a specialized industry can have a competitive advantage in the market and
growth of such an industry means growth of other local related businesses, and growth of local
businesses should lead to economic growth of the state.
The following chapter, Chapter 2, discusses in detail the theoretical aspects for the
relations between economic growth and innovation, diffusion, entrepreneurial programs, and
policy congruence with the industrial specialization. Chapter 2 also discusses why incentiveorinted programs may lead to economic leakage. Chapter 3 empirically examines how innovation
and diffusion influences economic growth. Chapter 4 also empirically presents the influence of
entrepreneurial and incentive-oriented programs on economic performance. Chapter 5 also
emipirically examines the influece of policy congruence in terms of a state’s industrial strength
6

on economic growth. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes with presenting some limitations and a
summary of the findings and contributions of this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND GOVERNMENT STRATEGIES

This chapter looks into the factors of economic growth and the strategies that
governments engage in to improve economic performance. I examine this by first looking at
comparative, cross-country studies and then focusing on the economic development among the
American states. To establish the case for the American states, I first discuss the nature, purpose,
and agents of the economic strategies adopted in the 50 states. Economic development strategies
in the American states involve providing financial assistance to the businesses and sometimes to
communities to help develop businesses and the business environment. These strategies are
adopted in order to primarily boost economic growth by creating jobs, providing worker training,
and providing financial and technical services to product development and innovation. A state
governor’s office principally coordinates the programs associated with economic development
policies.
This chapter discusses the theory in detail for the questions presented in Chapter 1. In
order to answer whether innovativeness is a factor of economic growth, I discuss how innovation
is an essential component for the survival in capitalistic market competition (Cox 1995).
Innovativeness creates a competitive advantage in the market and thus leads to improved
economic performance (Porter 1990; Walker 1969). To answer the second question, whether
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types of the policies matter to economic performance, I discuss why entrepreneurial policies
should improve the business environment in the state and why incentive-oriented policies may
lead to revenue leakage from the economy. Entrepreneurial programs develop a potential base in
the community to grow entrepreneurs who are more likely to reinvest within the economy
(Langer 2001; Leicht and Jenkins 1994), unlike out-of-state investors who are more likely to
move the revenue from the host-economy to another location. Incentive-oriented programs that
support inward investments often neutralize the home advantage of the local entrepreneurs and
provide external investors a competitive advantage. Thus, with incentive-oriented programs,
external investors replace home businesses (Turner 2003) and move the revenue out of the state.
Finally, I discuss how policies congruent with the industrial strength of the state may lead to
economic growth. A specialized industry consists of propulsive firms that are innovative because
they deal with concurrent market demand (Glasson and Marshall 2007). Such an industry also
grows other related businesses. Together they form a cluster and contribute to economic growth.
If economic development policies focus the cluster, they should lead to improved economic
performance (Porter 1990, 2003). This chapter finally discusses the variables and
operationalization to test these theories empirically.

2.1 Factors of economic growth
Cross-country studies that look into variation in economic growth chiefly examine the
factors of geography, institutions, and macroeconomic policies. On the geographic factors,
studies that look into latitude find that tropical countries exhibit lower economic growth than the
temperate countries because of low fertility of soil, dearth of supply of water, short summer days,
hot and dry weather, etc. in the tropical regions (Sachs and Warner 1995). Land lockedness, over
9

dependence on particular commodities, unavailability of a trade route (especially marine), germs,
type of crops (mainly unavailability of grain crops) are some of the other geographic factors that
scholars find responsible as initial conditions that affect economic growth (Easterly and Levine
2003). However, many scholars challenge the independent role of the geographic factors and
argue that geography shapes the institutions, which may cause the variation in economic growth
(Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Engerman and Sokoloff 1994). This view suggests
that European colonialists formed extractive institutions where disease environment prevented
settlement (e.g., Guyana) (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001) or scale of economies in
crop production necessitated a slave-based economy (e.g., Brazil) (Engerman and Sokoloff
1994). The colonialists formed democratic institutions in areas where they could settle, and such
areas were characterized by having controllable threats of germs (e.g., Australia, United States)
(Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001) or prevalence of small family farms that did not
necessitate a large involvement of labor (e.g. North America) (Engerman and Sokoloff 1994).
On macroeconomic policies as a factor of economic growth, some studies find that,
increase in money supplies increase economic growth (e.g., Fischer 1979). However, that may be
possible for a period of downturn but in regular economic situations, inflation and much
variation in monetary supply negatively impacts economic growth (Barro 1976; Kormendi and
Meguire 1985). Therefore, like geographic factors, macroeconomic factors also do not
independently cause economic growth; rather, it is the institutions that may impact economic
growth by leveraging geographic advantages and regulating macroeconomic policies.
Cross-country studies are useful for establishing an understanding of factors that explain
varying economic growth; however, the results do not perfectly offer an explanation of crossstate variation within a country. In the United States, states are party of a federal system in that
10

they are connected to each other based on mutual interdependence, and they maintain a free flow
of goods and commodities (Hendrick and Garand 1991). Again, as Berkowitz and Clay (2012)
argue, variation in initial conditions in terms of occupational homogeneity and legal systems
influenced the political competition in legislatures and independence in the courts of the
American states which ultimately impacted the economic growth of the states.

2.2 Economic development strategies in the American states
The government undertakes various economic development policies to boost economic
growth by facilitating secure business transactions, by providing necessary resource and
infrastructural support, and by ensuring a favorable business climate. The federal government
makes monetary policies, supports business transactions, and provides funding to local
governments (Feldman, Lanahan, and Lendel 2014). The federal grants are meant for education,
training, transportation, infrastructure, community, and regional development that help directly
or indirectly improve the business climate of state and local governments (Dilger and Cecire
2019). However, state governments are principally involved in all other activities to promote
economic growth, while local governments like cities takes care of the public living environment
by conducting public works activities. States essentially regulate how businesses are conducted,
support business promotion, and facilitate development of human capital among others. State’s
functions also include control of banks, insurance, labor, and taxes.
There were historically four waves of economic development actions in the states
(McMillan 2012). The First Wave occurred from the 1920s through the 1960s, when a great deal
of investment happened in highways and transportation, communications, and ports among
others. The Second Wave involved smokestack chasing – investing with one major industry that
11

can create big employment opportunities – during the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1980s, the Third
Wave happened which included searching markets, factory-university collaboration, setting up
industry clusters, and finding partnerships. The Fourth Wave, starting in the 1990s, involves
finding foreign investors, and export promotion in foreign markets.
Scholars also group state’s economic development policies in a number of other ways.
Bartik (1991) describes some ‘traditional’ and ‘new wave’ incentive-oriented policy tools. Some
examples of ‘traditional’ policies are marketing industrial sites, financial incentives like tax
abatement and loans, and non-financial incentives like infrastructural provisioning and
regulatory assistance. Some examples of ‘new wave’ policies are government loans, equity
programs, export assistance, education for small businesses, research, and the use of hi-tech.
Leicht and Jenkins (1994) do a factor analysis and group all of a state’s economic development
strategies into three categories: entrepreneurial programs, industrial recruitment programs, and
labor control programs (Table 2.1). Entrepreneurial strategies are to help investors with startup
finances and technological training. Industrial recruitment includes both investing in
infrastructure in order to reduce cost of production (factor cost) of industrial products and
providing direct incentives like subsidies and tax abatements to lure new industry. Industrial
recruitment programs are also known as incentive-oriented programs. Thirdly, labor control
programs include adopting right-to-work laws in order to discourage unionization and thereby
improving the business climate of the states.
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Table 2.1: Most common strategies of economic development in the American states listed by
Leicht and Jenkins (1994)
Entrepreneurial
Programs

Industrial
Recruitment
Programs

Labor control
programs

Public venture capital programs
Business incubators
Technology assistance centers
Research and technology parks
Technology and managerial
Assistance programs
Research and development tax credits for high-technology industries
Technology grants
Technology transfer programs
Customized labor training for high-technology industries
Export promotion programs
Direct state loans and loan guarantees
Financing for existing plant expansion
Revenue bond financing
Tax abatements for land and capital
Tax exemption on manufacturers’ inventories and equipment purchases
Accelerated depreciation tax credits
Sales tax exemptions on equipment and raw materials
Job creation tax credits
Tax incentives for industrial investment
General research and development tax credits
General job screening and training programs
Private development credit corporations
Industrial parks
Enterprise zones
Right-to-work laws
Absence of state minimum wage law
Absence of state fair employment law
Reduced workmen’s compensation taxes
Relaxed environmental regulation

2.3 The agents of state’s economic growth
Given the fiscal ability, the state government, as the main actor, undertakes economic
development policies to improve the state’s economic growth. Among the national, regional, and
state components that may impact economic growth, Hendrick and Garand (1991) find that the
state’s role is the most dominant (explaining 75% of variation in economic growth after the late
13

1960s). Regional and national components also play a role. In the early 1960s, the national
components are found to explain 23-28%, regional components 5-6%, and state components 61%
of the variation in economic growth (Hendrick and Garand 1991). While many states may have
fiscal constraints, all states have access to sufficient information resources to help them with
making economic development policies.
In order to make these policies, modern states do policy research using their own staffers
and external sources. After the Supreme Court’s ruling in 1960 for population based
representatives in state legislatures, policy analysis has become important to the state
governments to better serve their people (VanLandingham 2018). Now states’ legislative
branches and executive branches have their own staffers for policy research. External think tanks
like universities also help states with policy research. Government led analyses are also readily
available at the policy makers’ request. Although states have their own research to make policies,
the problem is that such research may not be a reflection of the true reality. Their own research
can be biased by the desire of the policy makers (VanLandingham 2018). External think tanks
can do independent research but they may not be relevant to the requirement of the states.
However, policy makers can also get information from research intermediaries who do large
scale research in the US. Overall, the state governments have sufficient resources to make
informed policy decisions unless they are constrained by time or electoral considerations (Karch
2007).
On the federal level, the functional aspects of federalism determines a great deal of
involvement of actors from the federal government and state government with a state’s economic
activity (Inman and Rubinfeld 1997). A confederate federalism is one proposed by Montesquieu,
which ensures more representation but less economic efficiency. A compound federalism
14

advocated by Madison is one which is more centralized in nature but offers better economic
efficiency. At the beginning of the Union, the federal government had a relation with the state
governments based on dual federalism characterized by the separation of functions of each
government, which moved to cooperative federalism afterwards, and again to coercive
federalism, and finally to a mix of all three types (Geer, Schiller, and Segal 2014; McMillan
2012). This relationship produces varied outcomes of economic development policies for the
states. For instance, in terms of dual federalism, interstate commerce is under the authority of the
national government, and intrastate commerce under the states. If we ask whether the federal
government can regulate a company doing business in multiple states, the answer is no, so long
as the businesses do not affect interstate commerce. More specifically, if the business is a local
activity such as a sugar refinery, the federal government cannot regulate the business even if the
local refinery is a branch of company that does business nation-wide. In 1895, the Supreme
Court ruled against the federal government stating that it cannot regulate the sugar refining
business of the company (E.C. Knight Co.) because manufacturing by a company located in a
state was under intrastate commerce (United States vs. E.C. Knight Co.) (Geer, Schiller, and
Segal 2014). However, if the local business is a part of the business chain across multiple states,
federal government can act to regulate the monopoly (Swift & Co. vs. United States).
Still, a company with multiple branches in multiple states can develop a monopolistic
capability in the overall national market using their technical ability and innovations, to the least.
With this kind of monopolistic market competition, problems arose when concentration of
wealth happened in several regions. The national government, consequently, wanted to reduce
the inequality by taking welfare projects such as the ones under the New Deal. In order to fund
the welfare projects, Congress attempted to regulate the industry by its power to lay and collect
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taxes but the Supreme Court ruled those regulations unconstitutional by the reference of the 10th
amendment. Therefore, not only the nature of federalism but the ruling of Supreme Court also
plays a role influencing the economic activities across the states.
Moreover, there is a principal-agent relationship at work in the process of fund
disbursement among federal politicians and federal agents, and federal agents and local
politicians (Chubb 1985). Federal politicians can control/monitor the funding process in two
ways: first, by their expertise and power (e.g. oversight committee membership) and second, by
their power to select grantees among the whole set of potential grantees based on ideology,
constituency type, etc. At the same time, federal leaders can help state business in a number of
ways: by setting meetings with out-of-state business leaders, by establishing universities in the
states, by altering regulations, by setting up foreign trade zones in the states, etc. (McMillan
2012).
The likelihood of receiving federal grants increases when interjurisdictional cooperation
among geographically proximate county, city, township governments within the metropolitan
regions of states happens (Bickers and Stein 2004). Positive externalities for spillover effects are
the reason why interjurisdictional cooperation may lead to more efficiency (Bickers and Stein
2004). Highway construction or joint river management, for instance, requires joint grant
application and requires neighboring governments to share information and resources. Usually
coordinated by Congressional representatives, the joint applications increase the chance of
receiving federal grants. The projects that have a geographic specificity is more likely to receive
these grants than projects without geographic specificity. Bickers and Stein (2004) find that an
additional interlocal agreement per 10,000 people has a chance of winning 0.48 new grants and
$27,655 in grant money for spatially specific projects, and 0.27 new grants and $1,215 in grant
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money for spatially non-specific projects. They also find that individual need and demand based
applications have a lesser chance of winning projects than applications that reflect interlocal
cooperation. However, jurisdictions with Congressional representation from two parties are less
likely to do interlocal cooperation than that from the same party.
States also directly work with governments of cities and counties. In fact, cities are more
connected with state governments than the federal government (Agranoff and Mcguire 1998).
State and cities work interdependently: State legislatures, various state agencies, such as
transportation or environment, are the ones that the cities work with the most (Agranoff and
Mcguire 1998). Cities are also equally well connected with interlocal agencies and partners.
However, the nature of connections depends on the definition of the economic/physical
development and interdependencies thereof based on the nature of the projects and financial
aspects. Mostly the mayor or city manager leads all economic development activities done within
the intergovernmental context. With this leadership, the agents of economic growth is a growth
coalition in cities consisting of local government, utilities, banks, and property capitals (Cox
1995). Within interlocal agencies, cities closely work with chambers of commerce, development
corporations, and private capital owners (Agranoff and Mcguire 1998).

2.4 Why does the government engage in economic development activity?
The government in the United States engages in economic development activities to
attain more economic success. In order to determine how the capital investments will take place,
and how the efficiency in production will be maintained, economic development requires
government policies (Bensel 2000). Since the late 19th century, the federal government has
maintained policy regulations to ensure capital mobility across local and foreign markets, free
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interstate commerce, and an unregulated business climate (Bensel 2000). These federal policies
shape a great deal of economic policies, activities, and growth at the state and local level.
Following the adoption of these policies, the U.S. economy started booming in the early
twentieth century with agriculture and automobiles. As an innovative sector, the U.S. automobile
started to dominate world business in the early twentieth century (Kurth 1979). After World War
II, the U.S. continued to gain access to foreign markets for local commodities and also invested
in foreign countries such as in the automobile industry in Europe (Kurth 1979). However,
following World War II, in order to maintain economic efficiency both in the local and export
markets, and to provide better services to citizenry, the federal, state, and local governments
adopted various economic development policies to modernize and professionalize the economic
activities in the states of the United States.
As a capitalist economy, three elements have shaped the economic development activities
in the US since the late 19th century: protection for the industry, conservative monetary policy,
and an unregulated market (Bensel 2000). Bensel (2000) argues that the Republican Party acted
as the agent of economic development in the late 19th century. He also argues that tariff policy
was not required for economic reasons to protect local industries from foreign competition but
was required to form a popular coalition for the Republican Party. The gold standard as a
conservative monetary policy and an unregulated labor and production market have been
required for economic reasons. By maintaining consistency with international price of gold, the
economy can maintain a consistent exchange rate for capital investments. By ensuring a free
interstate commerce and an unregulated business climate in terms of unionization and
environmental matters, the economy can maintain efficiency in the industrial production. Bensel
(2000) also argues that a class-oriented force for redistribution of wealth was not successful in
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the US and that capital accumulation for persistent investment was possible here. In order to
appease the class cleavage, a broad coalition of industrial workers, farmers, and financial elites
was necessary. In the US, during late 19th century, the Republican Party, the Supreme Court, and
Congress could enable all these three conditions for economic development. A cross-class
coalition was possible for the tariff policy, which has remained under Congress. An unregulated
market was possible for the Supreme Court rulings that have maintained preventing any
blockage from free flow of interstate commerce. Finally, the gold standard for the international
market was maintained by the treasury department under the executive branch in order to
facilitate a proper exchange of capital transfer across industries and across the states in the
United States until early 1930s (Bensel 2000). Although the gold standard was abandoned in
1933 and so was completely in 1971, the treasury has maintained facilitating a stable exchange
of capital money using the dollar. With that, the dominance of dollar in the international market
has provided the necessary conditions for U.S. industries to compete in the export-markets,
influencing the economic development activities in the various states.
At the state level, industrialization, natural resource management, and key human
development activities have been the most important economic development activities. Each
state competes to lure industry and mobile capital. In order to remain competitive, states adopt
various economic development polices (discussed above). However, economic development at
the state level centers on the cities in the states. City governments’ economic activities influence
the competitiveness of the state as a whole. However, in particular, the literature, known as New
Urban Politics (NUP), holds that cities engage in economic development activities for structural
reasons (Peterson 1981). Local governments basically engage in economic development
activities in order to deal with fiscal stress as a structural process (Peterson 1981; Wolman and
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Spitzley 1996). NUP discusses politics of competitions and power relations for inward
investments for fiscal management and economic development of cities and communities (Cox
1995). Cities seek inward investments for projects like metropolitan shopping malls,
gentrification of downtowns, airline hubs, and so on. So, cities, like private companies,
constantly upgrade their standings by adopting growth policies (Peterson 1981). Other studies
hold that the adoption of economic policies is contingent on fiscal conditions (Bowman and
Pagano 1992). But why would external investors prefer one city over another from the list of
substitutable candidate cities that are looking for mobile capital? NUP holds that these
investment choices are made as an effect of change at national or international scale (Cox 1995;
Wolman and Spitzley 1996).
However, Cox (1995) argues that in a capitalist economy this competition for mobile
capital is necessary because there are many economic interests that are place bound and it is
more important to examine local level determinants because those interests depend more on the
local environment than on the national environment. There are two types of competition: weak
and strong. Weak competition takes place over availability of raw materials, labor, and
technology at a cheaper price. Strong competition takes place over revolutionizing productions
by pushing the economy toward new products, new forms of organization, new materials, better
machineries, creative financing, etc. As there are growing multi-location corporations, and
vertical integration of production, strong competition requires a spatially dependent plant setup.
So, for the territorial dependency of the firms, cities also have some bargaining power. NUP,
however, looks at the weak competition only and commonly assumes that cities or communities
have a weak bargaining position (Cox 1995).
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Politicians also have incentives to do symbolic and visible projects like the ones that
generate employment, and the ones that are related to physical or land development in order to
get positive evaluations from the voter base (Jensen and Malesky 2018; Wolman and Spitzley
1996). Apparently, political leaders have benefits in using the incentives to lure out-of-state
firms. Especially, the incumbent candidate offers incentives to lure a firm to claim credit of
creating employment to win reelection. Again, it is also about winning the firm’s location from
the neighboring competitor, which is also rewarded by the voters (Jensen and Malesky 2018).
The proclivity to use incentives happens when there is an upcoming electoral pressure or when
the candidate will be held responsible for failure to create jobs or economic growth. Finally,
politicians and bureaucrats consider their success of bringing firms into their locality as their
professional ability to convince a firm to locate in their own-state. So, states do strategic decision
making in response to neighboring states’ decisions (Walker 1969; Wang 2018). If neighboring
states increase economic development incentives (EDI), the state also increases EDI. The
competition with the neighboring states is from the motivation of pulling skilled labor, checking
immigration, and also giving voters a sense that their home state is better than the neighboring
states (Jensen and Malesky 2018).
There is also a growth machine theory that views the growth of cities as a phenomenon
driven by private interests (Logan and Molotch 1987). According to this view, the concentration
of economic activities helps a group of people who owns local property. Therefore, this group
utilizes political leadership to use public money in infrastructural development as a growth
machine, which in turn brings inward industrial investments and immigrant people. For the
increase in economic activity, land value increases, and so does rent. Along this line, there is
another theory – quid pro quo – stating that private parties contribute campaign money and
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politicians in return provide them economic development incentives. However, Jensen and
Malesky (2018) did not find evidence to back these theories.

2.5 Innovation and diffusion of economic development policies
Innovation is an idea, object, or practice that is perceived as new by the adopter
individual or another unit of adoption (Rogers 2003). Diffusion is process by which an
innovation is communicated in a social system by some channels (Rogers 2003). There are four
main elements of diffusion: the innovation, communication channels, time, and the social
system. Usually, technology is used synonymously with innovation. A technology has a
hardware and a software part. A hardware part is the tools involved with the technology and the
software part is the information base behind the technology. As the adopters seek to reduce
uncertainty they ask two questions about the new technology: what the technology is about and
what are the consequences (Rogers 2003). The interrelated technologies (also called technology
clusters) are interdependent, and innovation in one technology may bring an innovation to
another related technology (Porter 1998). Communication channels are the means by which an
innovation is communicated. There are homophilous and heterophilous individuals and societies.
Diffusion occurs more among homophilous units than among heterophilous units. More effective
communication happens among homophilopus units that belong to the same social group, are
located near to each other, and share the same interests (Rogers 2003).
The third element, time, is involved in the diffusion process in three ways: first, is the
initial decision whether to adopt or reject an innovation; second, innovativeness – is the relative
earliness or lateness to adopt an innovation; third, rate of adoption, i.e., the number of members
that adopted an innovation in a given time period (Rogers 2003). The initial decision may follow
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on five main steps: knowledge, persuasion, decision, implementation, and confirmation.
Knowledge is awareness of the innovation, persuasion is making a favorable evaluation of the
innovation, decision is adopting the innovation, implementation is practically applying the
innovation, and confirmation is when the adopter seeks reinforcement of the innovation. Rogers
(2003) introduces five categories for innovativeness: innovators, early adopters, early majority,
late majority, and laggards. Adoption of innovation is subject to the cost of uncertainty. The
innovators are able to cope with more uncertainties. The late majorities are low in social status,
do not use media channels much, etc. Finally, the rate of adoption is measured by the time
required for a certain percentage of members to adopt the innovation. However, adoption
depends a great deal on the social system. One innovation diffuses quickly in one system but can
be slow in another system (Rogers 2003).
The fourth element of diffusion, social system, is a patterned structure that modifies the
diffusion process. A change agent acts based on the norms of the social system using opinion
leaders to diffuse a new idea. Change agents try to introduce innovations that have desirable,
direct, and anticipated consequences. However, innovation in organizations depends on a set of
other conditions such as champions and opponents of an innovation and openness and the
formalization of the organization. Rogers (2003) find that the factors that positively influence
organizational innovation include leader quality, expertise of the workforce, resource availability
to everybody, size of the organization, and openness of the organizational systems. The factors
that negatively influence include centralization of the organizational system and formalization in
the working hierarchy among others.
Whether an innovation will diffuse depends on five basic characteristics of innovation:
relative advantage, compatibility, simplicity, trialability, and observability (Rogers 2003). These
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factors should work in the diffusion process of government policies as well. Policy diffusion
happens from one government to another government and from one department to another
department within a government. In other words, diffusion happens horizontally from state to
state and also vertically from the national level to state, from state to city, from city council to
service departments, etc. (top-down) and the other way around from city to state, sate to national,
etc. (bottom-up) (Boehmke and Pacheco 2016; Gray 1973). The policy decisions of a
government can be influenced by earlier policy decisions in other governments (Gilardi 2016;
Gray 1973). There are three agreed upon mechanisms in which policy diffuses: learning,
emulation, and competition. Learning refers to the policy making of one unit receives input from
the consequences of policy outcomes from another unit. Emulation is more like a reaction to
other unit’s policy choices. It can have symbolic similarity but differing objectives. Competition
is straight forward, in that competition occurs among units attempting to attract or retain
resources. There is yet another type of diffusion mechanism namely a coercive mechanism which
may happen from national/international pressure to adopt a policy (Gilardi and Wasserfallen
2019). However, there is a lack of conceptual consistency in the diffusion literature such as
diffusion researchers use geographic proximity as an indicator of both learning and emulation.
However, geographic proximity can show an outcome of diffusion but not necessarily can show
the process of diffusion. Again the over use of the neighboring variable as an indicator of
diffusion also creates confusion because neighboring clusters do not necessarily mean diffusion,
nor do neighboring ties mean there is a diffusion network (Gilardi 2016). Nonetheless, in terms
of theoretical advancement, scholars find that states that are similar in capacity tend to follow
each other and that learning from failure happens especially if states have similar ideological
status or legislature type (e.g. professional legislature) (Boehmke and Pacheco 2016). Adoption
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speed is one area which is not looked into much (Mallinson 2016). Innovative methodological
improvement is required alongside theoretical development to move this field forward (Boehmke
and Pacheco 2016; Gilardi 2016).
In political science, diffusion research has become widespread after the pioneering work
of Walker (1969) and Gray (1973). They contend that expenditures, as a measure of policy, can
be misleading because some states can achieve more effect with spending less money. Many
scholars measure political influence from the conflictual policy issues by observing who wins the
conflicts in the legislative process (such as based on roll call votes). However, winning
conflictual issues may not indicate political influence because the non-conflictual agendas that
are enacted unanimously make up most of the votes and the initiators of those vast majority of
policies may have more political influence (Walker 1969). So, a more important question is who
initiates a program. As such, central to diffusion research is identifying the innovation of policies
by the pioneer states and the patterns that the other states show in following the pioneering
states. States work as a democratic laboratory: if one state finds a policy successful, other states
follow that policy, and if one finds a policy unsuccessful, other states avoid that policy (Karch
2007). Walker (1969) finds that California, New York, and Michigan are states that have the top
innovation score while Mississippi and Vermont have the lowest. Defining the first 10 adopters
as innovative states, Gray (1973) finds similar to Walker (1969) that rich states (based on
personal income) and competitive states (based on electoral margin of governor elections) are
innovative. However, depending on the issue and time, poor states can also be innovative (Gray
1973). In terms of who follows whom, Gray (1973) finds that federal adoption of a policy has
significant influence on that of the states. There are also some regional clustering: the South
follows southern states, the Rocky mountain region follows their neighbors (Walker 1969).
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Policy diffusion happens through four stages of policy making: agenda setting,
information gathering, customization, and enactment (Karch 2007). Karch (2007) argues that
time constraints and electoral considerations are the key factors in determining which policy to
advance and which to ignore. Time constraints and electoral considerations play out differently
at the four different stages of the policy making process. At the agenda setting stage, time
pressed officials tend to choose innovations that are salient and do offer visible impacts (Karch
2007). Not the effectiveness of a policy’s content, at this stage, but politicians’ perception of the
merit of the policy and the debate terms in the legislature determine which policies to bring
forward (Gilardi and Wasserfallen 2019). National level debate can also influence the move of
policies to the agenda stage (Karch 2007). At the information gathering stage, time constraints
remain important, and officials intend to gather relevant information in a short time. So, they
prefer agendas that have readily available information. At the customization stage, the elected
officials tailor the policies according to the expectations of voter blocs and the organizations that
have support of the voter blocs (Karch 2007). At the enactment stage, they will enact policies
that are successfully adopted by ideologically congruent co-partisans. At the adoption stage, a
host government adopts policies that are successfully adopted by ideologically congruent copartisans. They also adopt policies that have electoral consequences in their reelection (Gilardi
and Wasserfallen 2019; Karch 2007). Finally, a principal-agent relation is also at work whereas
party leaders, governors, and chamber leaders act as agents of the party members to attain their
electoral goals (Karch 2007).
According to the punctuated equilibrium theory, policy diffusion happens both
incrementally and non-incrementally. Policy can diffuse suddenly at a faster rate or at a slow rate
and can stop (Boushey 2010; Mallinson 2016). Boushey (2010) finds policy diffusion similar to
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an epidemiological model of disease spread. Similar to disease contagion that depends on the
susceptibility of the receptors, the infectivity of the agent, and the medium with which the agent
is transported, policy diffusion in a national current context happens depending on the receptivity
of the state, characteristics of the policy innovation, and the vectors such as interest groups that
transmit the policy. In terms of speed, high salience policies have higher diffusion speed, and
complex policies have less (Boushey 2010; Mallinson 2016). Complex policies are defined
conventionally as the ones on economy, energy, trade, the environment, technology, health, and
the like. Morality policy has higher chance of being spread immediately like an outbreak, while
regulatory policies such as economic policies require more technical expertise, so such policies
depend on the capacity of the state. Governance policies tend to be slow and incremental.
Policies that have federal intervention such as federal incentives have a higher speed of adoption.
Considering state legislative capacity, states that have citizen legislatures are less likely to adopt
new policies immediately than those with professional legislatures as the latter have more
capacity to innovate (Boushey 2010). From a policy cluster point of view, policies that are
clustered—adoption of one innovative policy influences adoption of other related policies, such
as a technology cluster—have higher adoption speed than average (Mallinson 2016).
Scholars growingly studying more of the innovation process in organizations than
innovativeness of the organizations. Organizations have a predictable structure, which is viewed
through their predetermined goals, prescribed roles, authority structure, rules and regulations,
and informal patterns. Organizations adopt innovations through stages – initiation and
implementation, in the initiation stage there are two sub stages: agenda setting and matching, and
at the implementation stage there are three sub stages: redefining/restructuring, clarifying, and
routinizing. At the agenda setting stage, the performance gap, which is the difference between
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expected performance and actual performance, triggers innovation. Organizations continuously
scan for innovations. Matching means identification of whether the innovation is a good fit or
not. After this, the decision is made whether to adopt it or not. After the decision is made, the
implementation process starts. Implementation begins by restructuring the innovation according
to the organization’s own structure. If the components are too foreign to the organization, there is
a low chance of sustainability. The organization and the innovation both changes to some degree
in the adoption process. The clarification stage puts the innovation into widespread use in the
organization. If the users find it easy to modify according to their needs, the chance of
sustainability is higher. The routinizing stage therefore depends on participation. The higher the
participation, the higher the chance of sustainability of the innovation. In sum, there are some
basic characteristics of organizational innovations. First, larger organizations are more
innovative. Second, some organizational structure variables may play a positive role during the
initiation stage but a negative role in the implementation stage. For example, low centralization,
high complexity, and low formalization facilitate innovation at the initiation stage; but they
impede innovation at the implementation stage. Third, the presence of innovation champions are
required. Fourth, a performance gap in various organizational subunits triggers innovation. Fifth,
in order to adjust with the attributes of the innovation or to make the innovation fit with the
organizational systems, innovation and the organization usually change throughout the
innovation process at any stage of the sub processes.

2.6 How effective are economic development policies?
Whether economic development policies bring benefit to people depends on the type of
policy. The distribution of the benefits of growth from strong competition for territorial
28

dependency can shift to any social group depending on how the people that are in the local
power strata decide (Cox 1995). According to Cox (1995), although NUP theories assumes that
the growth benefits the underprivileged group only, it does not. It depends on how the growth
coalition wants it to be distributed. One possibility is that the benefits will reach rich suburban
residents if policies are such that appreciation rates of home values increases, property tax
decreases, and public service expenditures increases (Cox 1995). However, the poor will benefit
if policies are such that education costs decrease, public service expenditures decrease, and home
values decrease.
In terms of weak competition, if the firms/industry compete for availability of raw
materials, labor, and technology at a cheaper price, there will be locational substitutability. So
when industries are incentivized, that doesn’t contribute to economic development, rather it
increases inequality because it uses taxpayers’ money to help the private sector (Woodward
2012). This is such because of a redistributive mechanism at work – by forgoing tax, a state
government has less ability to finance welfare projects that would benefit the poor (Jansa 2020).
Again, the incentives given are ultimately benefitting either the firm owners or the existing
employees. But the local unemployed people are not getting the benefit that they would have
received through welfare projects (Jansa 2020).
Economic development incentives can cause income inequality for a market conditioning
mechanism: this mechanism works if incentives are given in a regular market condition, i.e., if
market conditions don’t change for incentives (Jansa 2020). For instance, if the minimum wage
law is not updated, pro-labor policies are not adopted, incentives to recruit firms would cause
inequality. So, without changing market conditions, if incentives are given after taxes are paid,
inequality will result in the long run (Jansa 2020). However, there are heterogeneous impacts for
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different policy incentives (Thom 2018). Thom’s (2018) study on incentives for the motion
picture industry finds that for transferable credits, there is a little impact on employment and for
refundable credits, there are some positive impacts on wages. In his study, there are 26 states that
utilize the refundable credits implying that the states have targeted beneficiaries in the film
making firms who receive the benefits of wage growth. This beneficiary group is fixed and
already in the industry. So, in this case too, incentives increase inequality. Thom (2018)
concludes that the basic idea of providing benefits to a few and diffusing the cost to many is at
work. Also, there is no economically advantageous situation for any state but New York and
California to invest in the motion picture industry, but still they spend money most probably
because their peers do so and they also fall in a tendency to take an action without doing any
cost-benefit assessment.
The literature of economics examines many variables of economic growth and identify
mixed results. Reed (2009) examines the robustness of 32 variables and finds 12 variables to
play a role in economic growth. He categorizes them into 4 groups: labor, economy, political,
and public sector characteristics. From labor and economic aspects, he finds education, share of
working age and female population, size of agriculture and mining sectors to be responsible for
economic growth. From public sector and political aspects, he finds size of federal sectors,
federal aid, decentralization, and some types of taxes to play significant roles in economic
growth. Jones (1990) examines the impact of several policies (education, highways, welfare,
hospital/health, and police/fire) on business establishments, employment, personal income, and
per capita income and finds that the size of the public sector is not associated with decline. He
finds that overall expenditures have little impact on economic growth, which may not affect the
existing variation among states. On various policy types, some promote growth and others limit
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growth. Welfare expenditures such as hospital/health are associated with economic decline.
Local expenditures such as on police/fire and education promote growth. Highways negatively
affect business establishments per capita income but do positively affect employment and
personal income.
The tax literature finds fiscal policies to be ineffective but spending on human capital and
infrastructure to have positive effects on economic growth but with spillover effects. Atems
(2015) finds that a 1% fiscal deficit decreases growth by 0.43% in the short run and 0.39% in the
long run. Private investment and employment have both short run and long run positive impacts
on growth, but spending has no impact. A 1% increase in tax decreases growth by 0.37% to the
own-state and 0.94% to the adjacent state as a spillover effect, which is 1.15% for both states
combined. Similarly, Ojede, Atems, and Yamarik (2018) find positive and spillover effects of
spending on education and infrastructure on economic growth.
Contrary to these studies, Bartik (1991) argues that local economic development
incentives help the local economy as well as the national economy. He argues that if services to
business increases, jobs will grow. With the growth of jobs, locally unemployed people will be
hired before the in-migration takes place for the jobs. Although the incentivized development
results in higher land prices in the short run, it improves human capital of the workers that get
the jobs immediately. Since both firms and households are mobile in the long run, these workers,
with the improved human capital would get better jobs in the long run. And, there are also
political pressures to use incentives in high unemployment areas, so such incentives basically
help the poor (Bartik 1991).
However, there should be differences for entrepreneurial and locational incentives where
the former should reduce and the latter should increase inequality (Jansa 2020). Along the
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entrepreneurial policy line, Leicht and Jenkins (2017) find that state high-tech development
policies increase job growth. One strategy is called technopole strategy that advocates
infrastructure development in particular areas that would support high-tech industries. Another
strategy is called entrepreneurship strategy, which is supportive of a more decentralized
approach that advocates supporting the entrepreneurs through various assistance programs.
Leicht and Jenkins (2017) Test these theories using seven development policies and find that
government policies that support entrepreneurs have a positive impact on job growth, especially
when they are in concert with locational agglomeration. Regional science scholars also advocate
that entrepreneurial assistance helps local economic growth (Porter 2003; Woodward 2012).
Similar to the effect of entrepreneurial policy, the regional science literature advocates
competitiveness and innovation in companies and nations through clusters of industries that
contributes to sustained economic growth. A cluster is an economic unit that can happen across
the boundary of counties, cities, or states (Porter 2007). A locally grown cluster of firms benefit
local growth because they specialize in a certain industry, they share intermediate inputs, and
they can hire from a stronger labor pool (O’Sullivan 2011). A competitive nation is one, which is
forward looking, encourages innovation, and maintains policies that do not bias competition by
favoring select companies (Porter 1990). Porter contends that factor conditions for innovation
and productivity are created in a competitive nation. Over dependence on natural endowments is
not sustainable if the factor conditions are not upgraded to a newer level. Again, monetary
policies such as exchange rate and fiscal policies to undermine competition are also detrimental
to growth and competitiveness.
The determinants of competitiveness are factor conditions, demand conditions, related
and supported industries, and firms’ management and competition with other firms. Factor
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conditions include skilled labor, infrastructure, etc. to compete with global firms. Demand
conditions is demand in the home market that force companies to upgrade and make them ready
for the foreign markets. Related firms are necessary in order to support the traded firms with
taking advantages of necessary forward, backward, and horizontal linkages. Finally, firm
management strategy needs to welcome competition, rivalry, and change because the pressure of
change helps to create innovative outputs, which is better than the rival companies. These four
determinants work together as a system and define a country’s competitive advantage (Porter
1990). Domestic rivalry leading to improvement and geographic concentration facilitating flow
of information interactively makes these determinants to transform into a system, a system that
brings a competitive advantage for the industry. So the related industries tend to cluster
physically and engage in competition. This competition benefits them mutually because
competition leads them to go through self-reinforcement processes (Porter 1990). They also get
connected by a vertical buyer-seller linkage or by a horizontal common customers, technology,
and networks linkage. Thus, clusters help upgrading the industries with faster diffusion of new
ideas and technology and overcoming inward focus, inertia, accommodation among rivals, and
the like (Porter 1990).
Porter (1990) challenges the doctrines that the government should help companies with
incentives and that the government should adopt a laissez-faire approach. He rather argues that
government should adopt a middle ground by enabling a fair competition for firms. With
incentivizing firms, government insulates them from the pressure to compete with foreign
companies. So, they become slow to innovate and eventually fail. Similarly, leaving everything
on the market is harmful because companies tend to merge, create alliances, to monopolize the
market, which also eventually hinders innovation in industries in the home country, resulting in a
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failure while competing with foreign companies. Porter (2007) asserts that federal policies are
absent for clusters. He criticizes the duplications of economic development expenditures done
for training of labor, export promotion, infrastructure investment, etc. but suggests using them
instead for clusters. Federal policy should avoid funding individual firms or targeted industries;
rather, they should be directed to the clusters. Since each cluster is unique and they promote
competitiveness and innovation, governments should focus on clusters. The focus should start by
identifying the clusters based on some criteria to find out related industries in a region. In sum,
the following policies should be taken for the clusters: avoiding funding individual targeted
business entities, taking an integrated approach of economic policy for the clusters (e.g., training
for the entire workforce in a cluster), creating federal economic programs focusing on the
clusters, and designating the clusters.

2.7 Empirical analysis
In order to operationalize what economic growth would mean, it is important to
understand the difference between the terms with similar meanings. The literature on subnational
economic growth largely ignores the difference between economic growth and economic
development, rather uses the terms interchangeably (Wolman and Spitzley 1996). While the
term, economic development, encompasses broad economic wellbeing such as capacity of the
economy to deal with changes, participation of population in economic activities, distribution of
resources, etc., the term economic growth measures economic wellbeing in terms of measurable
indicators such as income and employment (Kindleberger and Herrick 1977). Although many
studies of subnational economic growth discuss economic development to mean broad economic
performance, all studies use one or more of the indicators of economic growth either directly or
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as a proxy of economic development or economic performance (Wolman and Spitzley 1996).
Some studies also mean physical development such as highways, ports, air terminals, and
building of other infrastructure by economic development. Finally, some other studies use both
growth and development together to mean economic performance (e.g. Glasson and Marshall
2007). The most common variables that scholars use to indicate economic growth, development,
or performance are growth of employment, income, and GDP.
Measuring economic growth using various subnational/local geographic entities as the
unit of analysis makes it difficult to make comparisons across studies. Most scholars analyze
economic growth from the city level or metropolitan level and label that as local level economy.
Some county level studies also label the economy of the county as local level economy.
Nevertheless, many studies take states as the unit of analysis. Taking states or local level entities
as the unit of analysis has one problem, which is how to address the spillover effects of
businesses or industries that share jurisdiction of multiple states or entities (Hui and Cho 2017).
Consequently, the ‘location quotient’ used to measure industrial concentration in a geographical
location poses some issues for spatial overlaps (Woodward 2012). Nonetheless, most commonly,
the literature uses the administrative jurisdiction as the analytical unit, and notably, some studies
use spatial econometric models and others incorporate calculations for geographical fixed effects
in their models to address the fact that economic policies taken in one state can affect the
economic growth of another state (Hui and Cho 2017). Given the above discussion, to examine
the role of economic development policy on economic growth, I use GDP and personal income
as the measures of economic growth.
Economic development policies are programs and various services that governments
offer to help businesses. The federal government and the state governments offer technical
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services and incentives to help businesses that have a national level significance. The federal
programs mostly target businesses that are involved in international trades. The state
governments are, however, the primary source of assistance that businesses receive in the states.
Coordinated by the state governor’s office, the economic development programs are executed by
various government agencies and various government authorized agencies like private banks.
Government agency that deals with economic development, sometimes together with community
affairs, offer the most programs in the states (Table 1.2). The Council for Community and
Economic Research (C2ER) has gathered program data for the states. C2ER has two different
databases: one on program description and another on program spending. The descriptive
database includes currently operational programs, and the spending dataset includes functionwise program spending since 2008. The descriptive dataset has details of program nature,
program type, program purpose, start year, eligibility criteria, etc. for most of the programs.
However, this dataset has some missing program start years that I need to measure
innovativeness. I scraped the data in early 2021, and I find 2,076 active programs in 50 states and
1,396 programs (67%) have a program-start information. I also have some missing data for
industrial target of a program, which I need to measure policy congruence. I have around 45% of
the programs with information on program’s target industry. The spending dataset, on the other
hand, has a different categorization scheme from the descriptive dataset. These two datasets have
different units of analysis and different program categories which make it difficult to merge these
two datasets.
To test the theories on economic development policy, I look at the type of policy,
innovativeness of the policy, and diffusion characteristics of the policy. On the type of the
policy, I distinguish between entrepreneurial and incentive-oriented to see the effects of each of
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them on economic growth. I control for traditional factors of economic growth that includes
labor force and human development, infrastructural investments, and capital on research and
development. In order to control for the effects of federal government incentives, I include
federal infrastructure and R&D spending in the states. I also control for political factors of policy
choices, which is an interaction term of policy choice and government ideology, to incorporate
any effect of government’s policy decisions depending on which party is in power.

Table 2.2 : State agencies that execute economic development policies in the U.S.
Department and agency (main functions)
Economic development
Community affairs
Revenue and taxation
Commerce, business and technology
Agriculture
Finance, bank and capital
Energy services
Film and tourism
Natural resources and environment
Labor and workforce

Number of programs (Percent)
729 (34%)
170 (8%)
500 (23%)
302 (14%)
66 (3%)
166 (8%)
37 (2%)
38 (2%)
89 (4%)
69 (3%)
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CHAPTER 3
POLICY INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

As discussed in the previous chapters, policy innovation may lead to economic growth
because of two primary reasons. One reason is related to market demand for the policy under
consideration and another is related to the technology that may receive momentum for adopting a
specific policy. First, innovation happens because there is a market demand for an economic
product. Secondly, the economic product solves a current problem. An innovative policy diffuses
if it has a market demand and if it is technologically effective. Demand for an economic product
is always replaceable as new products emerge. Therefore, policy has to change in order to
address the new dimensions of the new product. Therefore, innovation in policy is a dynamic
phenomenon. The entities that are already advanced in terms of their experience with the
previous versions of the economic product are more likely to innovate the policies that may
create some advantages to the newer versions of the product. The new products can make
economic revenue if they can respond to the market demand. The entities that can offer new
products constantly may have advantages in increasing their economic growth. On the other
hand, the technology that can offer both easy-to-handle hardware and easy-to-process software is
more likely to diffuse. Therefore, if an innovative policy does not diffuse, we may find that that
policy lacks market demand and/or is technologically ineffective. These arguments lead to the
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hypothesis that if a policy is innovative and if that policy diffuses, it should positively influence
economic growth. In this chapter, we will see empirically whether this hypothesis holds.
Given the widespread mobility of labor and capital, economic growth of the states is a
function of the state’s competitive advantages (Porter 1990), the state’s export based enterprises
(Glasson and Marshall 2007), the state’s entrepreneurship (Audretsch, Keilbach, and Lehmann
2006; Klobuchar 2013), and innovation (Klobuchar 2013). In order to capture whether American
states have these advantages, this research looks at the per capita gross domestic product (GDP)
and per capita personal income (Table 3.1). Using per capita measures are appropriate as to not
give state’s with larger economies more weight in the data. The per capita measures I use in this
research is in current dollars. I did not use inflation adjusted measures because of three reasons:
1) I have monetary values (state’s expenditure on economic development) in the independent
variables which are not inflation adjusted, 2) I have considered a period of 2 years lag for the
independent variables, attempting to adjust inflation would bias the dependent variable even
more, and 3) the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) has 2012 as the reference year for
calculating real GDP but the data are between 2008 and 2019, so the impact of inflation would
not be much in this analysis.
Figure 3.1 presents per capita GDP of various states in eight BEA defined economic
regions. Per capita GDP of various states range from $31,000 to over $90,000 over a period of 12
years (Figure 3.1). The figure shows that the southern states have relatively lower per capita
GDP than the northern states. However, there are high variations of GDP within regions
implying that there is possibly no effect of neighboring states on GDP. Most of the states have an
interquartile range of between $5,000 and $10,000 for a period of 12 years except a few states
notably big states like New York, California, and Texas. This implies that, states with larger
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economies have higher variation in per capita GDP than the states with smaller economies in the
short run. This scenario suggests that, even if there might be minute regional effects on economic
growth, the modeling for GDP in the states should take account of state’s individual effects in
order to address unique characteristics within each state.

Table 3.1: Required data for Hypothesis 1: Policy innovativeness leads to economic growth (H1)
Dependent Variable

Independent Variable

Control Variables

1. Per capita GDP
(BEA)
2.Per capita Personal
Income (BEA)

1. Innovativeness as a factor
program count* (C2ER)
2. Innovativeness as a factor of
program spending* (C2ER)

1. Federal funding on
transportation (NASBO)
2. State government’s funding
on higher education (NASBO)
3. Waged and salaried
employment (BEA)
4. R&D Expenditure in the
states from federal, state, and
private sources (NSF)
5. State government’s ideology
(Berry et al. 2010)

Notes:
Acronyms in the parentheses are data sources
BEA = Bureau of Economic Administration,
C2ER = The Council for Community and Economic Research,
NASBO = National Association of State Budget Officers, and
NSF = National Science Foundation
* Author computes the innovativeness based on C2ER program data
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Unit of
Analysis
StateYear

Figure 3.1: Per capita GDP of various states for 2008 to 2020
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Policymakers and researchers both agree that not just demographic factors but more
dominantly fiscal and economic policies influence economic growth. All fiscal and monetary
policies and some dominant economic policies are taken at the federal level government
agencies. For instance, the Federal Reserve focuses on price stability by rules based monetary
policy but fails to pay attention to unemployment (Brady 2013). In order to grow employment,
some suggest that monetary and fiscal policies needs to be predicatable so that investors can
have a better sense of their investment and operational costs (Boskin 2013). In order to reduce
the debt/GDP, spending on entitlements needs to be reduced and controlled. Some suggest to
focus on education to train the labor with industry-demanding technologies (Klobuchar 2013).
Economists growingly suggest fiscal consolidation, i.e., lowering federal spending to boost
economic growth in the long run (Boskin 2013; Goolsbee 2013). In light of the role or
importance of economic policies, this research principally looks at economic policies adopted by
the states and how innovative those policies are. Secondly, it also looks at how those policies
diffuse within the state in terms of scale of the policy implementation. It looks at how many
programs are adopted and how much money is spent by a state.
I use a number of control variables that are widely accepted as to impacting economic
growth: infrstructure, education, R&D expenditures, labor, and government ideology. As fiscal
policies and monetary policies are made at the federal level, I take account of federal expenditure
on infrastrucuture in the states that may boost economic growth. I use per capita federal spending
on transportation as a factor of economic growth. I do not use state level infrastructure as a
separate variable as state’s infrastructure spending can be included in my main independent
variable. In other words, the program count and program expeniture variables include some
expenitures on infrastrucutre. I use state level per capita education expenditures as a control
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variable as a proxy of skills of the labor force. Although not all workers contribute to the in-state
economy, the expenditures on higher education includes expenditures on research and
development, making it a more robust variable to explain economic growth. I also use state’s
labor force (waged employment per 1,000 population) as an indicator of economic growth as
well as state government’s ideology as a control variable because ideology may be an indicator
of the type of economic policies to be adopted by the states. That’s why I also use an interaction
term of state ideology and policy innovativeness to see how that plays out in the relationship
with economic growth.

3.1 Policy diffusion and innovativeness
As Rogers (2003) describes, an innovation is communicated in a social system through
diffusion. The first to adopt a policy choice is an innovator. Thus, the American states that are
the earliest in adopting a certain kind of policy are innovators for that policy. From there, I
examine how the innovation has been diffused across the states and within a state. The states are
the group that perceive a program as an innovation and individual government is the one that
makes decision as whether to adopt an innovation or not. In order to compute innovativeness, I
use both cross-state and within state diffusion processes. A state may have innovated a policy but
later stopped implementing the policy. Again, there may be another state that started late but has
continued using the policy in the state. To be effective as a policy to contribute to economic
growth, both the earliness of adopting a program and the frequency of the policy within the state
are important. In other words, both innovation and its diffusion are necessary factors for
increased economic growth. Therefore, in my measure of innovativeness I use both innovation
and its diffusion to get a more comprehensive measure.
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I use economic development programs and their adoption years to compute a state’s
innovativeness for all programs and certain categories of programs. First, I will discuss
uncategorized programs and later in the chapter, I will discuss the various categories of the
programs. Figure 3.2 shows cross-state diffusion of all economic development polices and Figure
3.3 shows within state diffusion of the same policies. From Figure 3.2, we see that economic
development programs were first adopted in 1933 in Utah. The states that immediately followed
Utah were Louisiana, Arkansas, New Mexico, Nebraska, and Maine. With respect to the states’
innovativeness, I classify them into three categories as innovators, early majority, and late
majority. I name the states that adopted policies in the first 20 years of a policies initial adoption
as innovators and the states that adopted within the next 20 years are early majority and states
that adopted beyond 20 years as late majority. I group states by these categories in the figure but
in actual measure of the innovativeness, I use the data that says how long the program is active in
the state. Although some states are innovators, they do not necessarily continue with the program
in the state. Some states are late adopters, but they have adopted a large number of policies and
continued operation. For instance, although Louisiana was an early adopter, at times, Maryland,
Kansas, and Oklahoma surpasses Louisiana in terms of number of policies adopted in the state
(Figure 3.3). Figure 3.3 shows diffusion of programs within the state. I hypothesize that both
innovativeness and diffusion thereof together contribute to economic growth (H1). Hypothesis 1
captures both of the factors as to when the policies were adopted and how many of those policies
are active in the state.
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Innovators (1933-1953)
Early majority (1954-1973)
Late majority (1974-2005)

Figure 3.2: Diffusion of economic development policies in the American States: First started in
Utah in 1933 and the latest in Tennessee in 2005
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53
37
Program count: 22

Figure 3.3: Diffusion of economic development policies within and across the American States:
Maryland currently has the highest program count, 90, and Louisiana, although an innovator,
currently has 27 current programs.
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3.2 Methods and models
I hypothesize that innovation in policymaking leads to economic growth. More
specifically, I hypothesize that regardless of policy-type, innovativeness promotes economic
growth (H1). This model assumes that innovation of policies happens in a state when it has tried
or experienced other alternatives and that innovation originates from in-state conditions to
address exclusively in-state problems. So, the early adopters will follow the leading adopter
because they share similar conditions such as ideological and/or similar implementation
capacities. I am using state fixed effect models in order to address unique conditions in each
state. I also use a lagged variable approach assuming there is a time-period for a policy to take
effect on economic growth. I assume a 2-year lag for innovativeness of the programs because the
programs may take some time to effect businesses. For the same reason I take a 2-year lag for
federal funding on transportation, state funding on higher education, R&D funding in the state,
and state government ideology. However, I did not consider any lag on employment as labor
immediately affects the economic output of the business.

3.2.1 Computing innovativeness
I compute innovativeness using two factors: 1. How quick is the state to adopt a new
program category, and 2. How many programs of that category the state adopts over a period. I
also examine how much money states spend on economic development programs. To answer the
first question, I use the following formula:
Innovativeness for a policy, i at time t,
Innot = (Yeart – Yearstart) – (Yearadopt – Ystart)
= Yeart - Yearadopt
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… … … (3.1)

This measure provides the experience a state has with a program in a given year. The
more experience a state has, the more innovative it is. However, when we see the state’s relative
position in terms of its innovativeness, starting a program earlier makes it always appear before
its fellow states that start the program later. Innovation on the micro-components of a program
may be still active, but innovation at the broad category is not an everyday phenomenon. That is
why, as I compute innovativeness for the broad program categories, starting a program earlier
does not necessarily make it more innovative. There can be a couple of reasons why adopting a
program earlier may not contribute more to economic growth. First, it may have adopted earlier
but may have failed to create an environment for the program to succeed. Secondly, it is possible
that ineffectiveness is a reason why that program has not been adopted again within that state.
This low frequency of adoption will reflect on the number of programs within a category of
programs a state adopts. In other words, a successful program is more likely to be scaled-up or
adopted by other governmental units within the state such as branch departments and subagencies. So, a count of programs is a good indicator of whether the program has diffused
within, and whether the program category could have an effect on the economy of the state.
However, the number of programs alone may not have an effect because a program may lose
efficacy after some years, but if a state increases the number of programs that may not
substantially positively affect the economy. Therefore, a product of how quick a state is to adopt
a policy and how many programs it does adopt is a better measure of innovativeness.
For example, if state A adopts a specific type of policy in 1990, which was innovated by
state B in 1985; in 2010, state A has 20 years of experience with that program and state B has 25
years of experience. In 2010, B ranks higher than A. if I continue the computation this way, in
2015, state B still ranks higher than state A, and state A has no way passing over state B.
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However, that does not seem very reasonable because state A may have implemented other
similar programs of that kind that have made positive impacts on the economy. In this example,
if by 2010, State A has 30 programs and state B has 25 programs, state B still ranks higher
because it has 25 years of experience and 25 programs in operation. By multiplying, it has a
score of 625 but state A has 600 even if it has more programs in 2010. If the program increase
continues, and if in 2015, state A has 40 program and state B has 30, state A will have a score of
40×25 = 1000, superseding the score of state B, which is 30×30 = 900.
However, for the second measure of innovativeness, expenditures will be a noncumulative number of expenditures unlike the count of programs as I do not have historical
figures on state program expenditures. I have expenditure data since 2008. For this reason, I use
per capita yearly expenditure data, which should reflect the number of operational programs.
However, if only yearly increment of programs is used, that would not have been reflective of
yearly expenditures, as the yearly expenditures is not only for the new increment of the programs
but the programs that are under operation in a given year. I multiply the expenditures with a
state’s experience with a program to get an innovativeness score based on program spending.

3.2.2 Fixed effect model

I employ fixed effect models by state because every state has some unique characteristics
of its own that needs to be addressed in the model. Fixed effects accounts for state level
differences that I do not control for in the model and that generally do not vary overtime. Tables
3.4 and 3.6 show the results of diagnostics tests to see if fixed effect models are more suitable for
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the data. I will discuss this in the latter section. First, let us consider the following equation for
the fixed effect model (3.2)

Yit=β0+β1Xit+β2Zi+uit
… … … (3.2)
where the Zi are unobserved time-invariant heterogeneities across the
entities i=1,…,ni=1,…,n.
We aim to estimate β1, the effect on Yi of a change in Xi holding constant Zi.
Letting αi=β0+β2, Ziαi=β0+β2Zi we obtain the model,
Yit=αi+β1Xit+uit
… … … (3.3)

Having individual specific intercepts αi, i=1,…,ni=1,…,n, where each of these can be
understood as the fixed effect of entity i, this model is called the fixed effects model (Arellano
2003). The variation in the αi, i=1,…,ni=1,…,n comes from the Zi and can be rewritten as a
regression model containing n−1 dummy regressors and a constant:
Yit=β0+β1Xit+γ2D2i+γ3D3i+⋯+γnDni+uit
… … … (3.4)
Model (3) has n different intercepts — one for every entity.

3.3 Results: innovativeness and economic growth
I regress per capita GDP and per capita personal income on innovativeness as a factor of
program count and innovativeness as a factor of program spending. Summary statistics of the
variables used are presented in Table 3.2. The scatter plot for economic growth and
innovativeness shows a positive relationship (Figure 3.4). I execute four models: 1) per capita
GDP on innovativeness based on program count (2-year lagged), 2) per capita GDP on
innovativeness based on per capita program expenditure (2-year lagged), 3) per capita personal
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income on innovativeness based on program count (2-year lagged), and 4) per capita personal
income on innovativeness based on per capita program expenditure (2-year lagged). The results
are presented in Table 3.3.

Table 3.2: Summary statistics of variables for modeling innovativeness and economic growth for
years between 2008 and 2020

Per capita GDP ($)
Per capita personal
income ($)
Years program is active
for (T)
Cumulative count of
active programs (C)
Per capita program
spending ($) (E)
Innovativeness score as a
factor of program count
(T×C)
Innovativeness score as a
factor of program
spending (T×E)
Per capita federal
funding on transportation
Per capita state funding
on higher education
Per capita R&D
expenditure in the state
Waged and salaried
employments per
thousands of population
State government
ideology

Minimum
31602

1st
Quartile
43783

Mean
52348

3rd
Quartile
59136

Median
50545

Maximum
91057

29855

39260

44372

45577

50770

77289

5

31

40

42.16

51

88

2

16

24

26.49

34

73

2.1

14.8

25.4

44.3

45.1

427.7

10.0

567.8

987.0

1206.6

1579.0

5330.0

32.9

307.7

644.2

1086.1

1293.9

19736.9

3.6

117.8

154.5

192.6

200.8

1640.5

66.1

369.8

713.3

774.8

1062.8

2380.7

0.17

2.5

4.5

6.0

8.1

24.7

385.6

436.5

464.6

467.4

493.6

650.6

17.5

26.9

44.5

44.1

61.1

73.6
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Figure 3.4: Scatter plot of per capita GDP and innovativeness
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Table 3.3: Linear regression for GDP and personal income on innovativeness
(Model 1)
Per capita
GDP
Innovativeness score as a
6.48***
factor of program count (-2)
(1.30)
Innovativeness score as a
factor of per capita program
spending (-2)
Per capita federal funding
6.79*
on transportation (-2)
(3.63)
Per capita state funding on
4.71***
higher education (-2)
(1.20)
Per capita R&D expenditure 268.59***
in the state (-2)
(78.18)
Waged and salaried
196.65***
employments per thousands
(16.22)
of population
State government ideology
-39.27
(-2)
(31.33)
Innovativeness (count) (-2)*
0.049**
state ideology(-2)
(0.025)
Innovativeness (spending) (2)* state ideology(-2)
Overall Intercept
-52395.0***
(7738.8)
Observations
283
Number of states
48
R-squared
0.75

(Model 2)
Per capita
GDP

(Model 3)
Per capita
Personal
Income
6.69***
(1.10)

1.21
(0.92)

(Model 4)
Per capita
Personal
Income

3.34***
(0.79)

4.74*
(2.78)
1.00
(1.05)
-21.30
(69.83)
371.17***
(12.57)

12.93***
(3.05)
3.63***
(1.01)
235.10***
(65.83)
151.60***
(13.66)

10.55***
(2.39)
0.42
(0.90)
108.85*
(60.04)
320.14***
(10.81)

-1.99
(23.30)

-42.45
(26.39)
0.049**
(0.021)

8.06
(20.03)

-0.018
(0.016)
-120780.0***
(6104.8)
235
49
0.84

-38418.0***
(6516.8)
283
48
0.79

-0.048***
(0.014)
-106260.0***
(5248.9)
235
49
0.86

Significance codes: p<0.001 ‘***’ p<0.01 ‘**’ p<0.05 ‘*’
Standard errors in parentheses

I find support for the hypothesis that economic growth increases as innovativeness
increases (Table 3.3). Specifically, I find strong statistical significance for economic growth and
innovativeness as a factor of program count. I also find strong statistical significance for personal
income and per capita program expenditures. For Model 1 in Table 3.3, I find that a one-point
increase in innovativeness may increase around $6 of per capita GDP. The control variables in
this model have significant estimates except for ideology, and the model diagnostics (Table 3.4)
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shows that I chose the correct models and included robust variables. Therefore, I can rely on the
estimate for GDP and innovativeness in Model 1. However, Model 2 does not produce a
statistically significant estimate. The diagnostics for Model 2 show that the model and variables
are chosen correctly, as such the results do not support the hypothesis that innovativeness as a
factor of program spending influences GDP. I again find robust estimates for personal income
and innovativeness. I find that a one-unit increase in innovativeness based on program count and
program spending may increase per capita personal income by $7 and $3, respectively. The
diagnostics in Table 3.4 shows that Model 3 and Model 4 have correct model specifications.
Model 3 and Model 4 also have all statistically significant estimates for the control variables.
The results support the hypotheses that innovativeness influences per capita personal income.

Table 3.4: Model diagnostics for economic growth and innovativeness of programs (Table 3.3)

F test for individual effects
Within vs. Pooling model
Time-fixed effects

(Model 1)

(Model 2)

(Model 3)

(Model 4)

Within
p<0.001
Significant
time effect*
P<0.001

Within
p<0.001
Significant
time effect*
P<0.001

Within
p<0.001
Significant
time effect*
P<0.001

Within
p<0.001
Significant
time effect*
P<0.001

Fixed
p<0.001

Fixed
p<0.001

Fixed
p<0.001

Hausman Test for Panel models
Fixed vs. Random effect

Fixed
p<0.001

Regression based Hausman
test

Model is not Model is not
Model is not
inconsistent
inconsistent
inconsistent
p<0.001
p<0.001
p<0.001
Regression-based Hausman Model is not Model is not
Model is not
test, vcov: vcovHC
inconsistent
inconsistent
inconsistent
p<0.001
p<0.001
p<0.001
* As the data is an unbalanced panel, the models do not account for time effects.
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Model is not
inconsistent
p<0.001
Model is not
inconsistent
p<0.001

3.4 Types of economic development policies in the American states
The results up to this point focused on the innovation and diffusion characteristics of
economic development programs but have not categorized those programs. There are two
primary categories that scholars use to analyze economic development programs: incentiveoriented programs and entrepreneurial programs (Table 3.5 and Table 3.6). Incentive-oriented
policies are designed to provide direct or indirect business assistance to individual parties,
namely, firms, companies, and similar business entities. On the other hand, entrepreneurial
programs are designed to support the community to promote entrepreneurship from within the
community. Tax reduction programs and business financing schemes are characteristic of
incentive-oriented programs; whereas, community financing schemes are typically within the
category of entrepreneurial programs. However, some programs have multiple parts falling under
both of the above categories (Figure 3.5).

Figure 3.5: Venn diagram of overlapping programs between incentive oriented and
entrepreneurial programs
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From the C2ER dataset, I have a total of 2,165 economic development programs, among
which 1,979 programs are wholly incentive-oriented and 61 are wholly entrepreneurial policies
(Figure 3.5). There are 84 programs that are grouped as both incentive-oriented and
entrepreneurial programs, and there are 41 programs that are not grouped as any of these
categories. I have a total of 2,063 (1,979+84) incentive-oriented policies and 145 (61+84)
entrepreneurial policies in the dataset (Table 3.5). These programs adopt various mechanisms to
provide funding, which includes tax incentives, business finance, and community finance.
Economic development programs mainly consist of various business finances and tax incentives.
Each state has direct government agencies such as agriculture related agencies and indirect
government authorized agencies such as creditor banks that administer these finances. These
finances are provided as tax credits, tax exemptions, equity investments, grants, loans, and bonds
under incentive-oriented programs. Under entrepreneurial programs, funding is provided as
grants and loans to local government agencies.

Table 3.5: An overview of various economic development programs in the program-list dataset
of C2ER
Economic
Development
programs
(2165)

Incentive-oriented
(2063)

Tax incentive
(941)
Business Finance
(1148)

Tax credit (585)
Tax exemption (395)
Grant (483)
Loan (466)
Equity investment (77)
Bond (70)
Entrepreneurial
Community
Grant (98)
(145)
Finance (145)
Loan (34)
Note. Figures in the parentheses indicate number of programs currently operational.
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The basic distinction, that seems reasonable from the C2ER program list dataset, between
incentive-oriented and entrepreneurial programs is whether the program is designed for a private
party or for a community. If it is targeted for a private party, it is an incentive-oriented program,
and if it is designed for the community, it is an entrepreneurial program. I have another unrelated
dataset from C2ER that is a record of spending on various economic development programs. The
program list dataset and the program spending dataset have categorized the programs quite
differently. Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 shows the difference of the categories. When using the
spending data in modeling, I group the economic development functions into incentive-oriented
and entrepreneurial programs based on the above definition. Functions like business finance and
strategic finance clearly fall under incentive-oriented programs, and community finance under
entrepreneurial programs. However, there are programs such as entrepreneurial development,
which is given to private parties, but they are not essentially targeted to recruit out-of-state firms.
Again, tourism/funding is grouped as one category but tourism funding is for the community, but
the film industry funding goes to private parties. That is why I group entrepreneurial
development and tourism/film under both incentive-oriented and entrepreneurial programs.
However, this grouping does not sound very appropriate because the actual dollar amount falling
under each side was necessary to attain a reliable modeling output. Moreover, there are other
possibilities of duplications such as in workforce preparation and development. I group it under
incentive-oriented programs but if the skill developed through this funding is transferred to a
local firm at a later time, then the funding can be regarded as entrepreneurial funding. However,
I did not have enough space in this study to parse that out. Alternatively, I use workforce
preparation and development under both categories and use that categorization separately in
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another model to see the output. This output is provided in the Appendix (Table A.2 and Table
A.3)

Table 3.6: An overview of spending on various economic development functions in the spending
dataset of C2ER
Economic
Development
programs
($223.7M)

Incentive-oriented
($136.0M)

Business finance ($0.22M)
Strategic business attraction fund (0)
Business assistance ($6.14M)
International trade and investment (0)
Domestic recruitment/out-of-state (0)
Workforce preparation and development ($11.77M)
Technology transfer ($0.55M)
Entrepreneurial development (0)
Tourism/film ($21.34M)
Special industry assistance ($16.76M)
Entrepreneurial
Entrepreneurial development (0)
($63.1M)
Minority business development (0)
Community assistance ($25.44M)
Tourism/film ($21.34M)
Note. Figures in the parentheses indicate spending of the median state in 2020.

With the program categories, first I run the models to see how the innovativeness of the
incentive-oriented and entrepreneurial programs contributes to economic growth. Secondly, I run
models to see how the innovativeness of the types of the programs namely, tax incentives,
business finance, and community finance contribute to economic growth.
For the first group, incentive-oriented and entrepreneurial programs, I hypothesize that
regardless of policy-type, innovativeness should increase economic growth. At this stage, I test
incentive-oriented and entrepreneurial policies for their influence on economic growth. I again
test both innovativeness based on program count (Table 3.5) and based on program expenditure
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(Table 3.6). To capture innovativeness (how long the program is active for) and within diffusion
(how many programs have been adopted), I use the same method as for the uncategorized
programs from above. Economic development programs that are incentive-oriented basically
started and diffused among most of the states as shown in (Figure 3.2 & 3.3). So, the diffusion of
incentive-oriented programs looks quite similar to what we see for all programs in Figure 3.2 and
3.3. Here I have a depiction for diffusion of entrepreneurial programs (Figure 3.6) which have
been diffused among 25 states (as the data shows) starting from Alaska in 1939. However,
Alaska has not adopted many programs although the state pioneered the entrepreneurial
programs. Although North Carolina started entrepreneurial programs late (in 1999), currently, it
has the most entrepreneurial programs (11) followed by Texas (9) and Mississippi (9).
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and Vermont are among the states that started entrepreneurial
programs after 2010. Connecticut, Idaho, and Colorado are among the states that started between
the 1980s and 2000s. However, this dataset lists programs that are currently active. If any
program that was started but also finished at some point is not listed in the dataset.
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9

4

Program count: 2

Figure 3.6: Diffusion of entrepreneurial programs in 2021 starting from 1939

I regress the same dependent variables (GDP and Personal Income) on the innovativeness
scores for incentive-oriented programs and entrepreneurial programs. Summary statistics of the
variables are shown in Table 3.7. I regress per capita GDP and per capita personal income on
innovativeness based on program count and program expenditures for incentive-oriented and
entrepreneurial programs. This produces four models each for GDP and personal income (Table
3.8).
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Table 3.7: Summary statistics of innovativeness of incentive oriented and entrepreneurial
programs for Years between 2008 and 2020
Years incentive-oriented program is
active for (TI)
Cumulative count of active
incentive-oriented programs (CI)
Per capita spending on incentiveoriented programs ($) (EI)
Innovativeness score for incentiveoriented programs as a factor of
program count (TI×CI)
Innovativeness score for incentiveoriented programs as a factor of per
capita program spending (TI×EI)
Years entrepreneurial program is
active for (TE)
Cumulative count of active
entrepreneurial programs (CE)
Per capita spending on
entrepreneurial programs ($) (EE)
Innovativeness score for
entrepreneurial programs as a factor
of program count (TE×CE)
Innovativeness score for
entrepreneurial programs as a factor
of program spending (in millions)
(TE×EE)

Min

1st Qrt

Median

Mean

3rd Qrt

Max

5

31

40

42.1

51

88

2

15

24

25.5

33

72

0.55

11.0

18.4

30.1

29.2

254.3

10.0

552.0

951.0

1158.0

1459.0

5166.0

7.7

192.9

415.7

737.2

912.0

9096.2

0

10.3

21.5

20.3

29

46

0

0

1

1.6

3

7

0

3.5

7.6

19.7

17.5

367.9

0

16.3

36.5

49.9

77.5

175.0

0

0

5.8

20.2

26.3

651.4

The results show a statistically significant estimate for innovation in incentive-oriented
programs (count-based measure) for both per capita GDP and per capita personal income. With
the spending measure, I find statistical significance for personal income and innovativeness of
incentive-oriented programs. For innovation in entrepreneurial programs, I find no statistically
significant estimate for the count-based measure but I do find so for the spending-based
measures. With statistical significance for the count-based measure, I find that a one unit
increase in innovativeness in incentive-oriented programs may increase per capita GDP and
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personal income by almost $7. I also find that, with statistical significance for the spendingbased measure, a one unit increase in innovativeness of entrepreneurial programs may increase
per capita GDP by $126 and per capita personal income by $79. The diagnostics (Table 3.9) also
shows that the variables and models used were robust. The diagnostics reveal that all but model 2
in Table 3.8 are appropriate for fixed effect models. Model 2 is appropriate for a random effect
model as the p-value for a fixed effect model is <1 for Hausman fixed vs. random effect testing
(Table 3.9). Overall, the results suggest that innovativeness of incentive-oriented and
entrepreneurial programs increase economic growth. However, I did not find statistical
significance for count based entrepreneurial innovativeness and spending based incentiveoriented innovativeness for per capita GDP.
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Table 3.8: Linear regression for GDP and Personal Income on Innovativeness of incentive-oriented and entrepreneurial programs
(2)
GDP
Random

Innovativeness 2 (-2)

(3)
GDP
Fixed

(6)
Income
Fixed

(7)
Income
Fixed

(8)
Income
Fixed

38.89
(28.52)
0.52
(1.15)

Innovativeness 4 (-2)

Observations
Number of states
Adjusted R-squared

(5)
Income
Fixed
7.00***
(1.13)

26.59
(32.23)

Innovativeness 3 (-2)

Per capita federal funding
on transportation (-2)
Per capita state funding on
higher education (-2)
Per capita R&D
expenditure in the state (-2)
Waged and salaried
employments per
thousands of population
State government ideology
(-2)
Innovativeness 1 (-2) *
state ideology (-2)
Innovativeness 2 (-2) *
state ideology (-2)
Innovativeness 3 (-2) *
state ideology (-2)
Innovativeness 4 (-2) *
state ideology (-2)
Overall Intercept

(4)
GDP
Fixed

2.22**
(1.02)

7.01*
(3.62)
4.69***
(1.20)
273.20***
(78.18)

8.09*
(4.54)
5.93***
(1.69)
459.85***
(114.34)

5.05*
(2.80)
1.30
(1.03)
-30.85
(70.53)

125.62***
(41.45)
4.13
(2.72)
0.48
(1.04)
-23.54
(67.72)

197.85***
(16.18)
-44.35
(31.06)
0.052**
(0.026)

182.34***
(22.45)
-78.39**
(36.40)

371.54***
(12.75)
-14.94
(23.30)

365.35***
(12.55)
8.95
(19.59)

13.14***
(26.14)
3.61***
(1.01)
240.05***
(65.81)

19.37***
(5.01)
7.69***
(1.62)
185.75*
(100.22)

11.10***
(2.49)
1.14
(0.92)
87.42
(62.53)

152.76***
(13.62)
-46.63*
(26.15)
0.051**
(0.021)

173.01***
(22.22)
-58.83*
(31.32)

321.32***
(11.30)
-16.49

2.01***
(0.73)

78.89**
(37.95)
10.72***
(2.49)
0.94
(0.95)
100.30
(62.01)
320.62***
(11.49)
-18.68
(17.93)

2.14***
(0.64)
-0.005
(0.021)

-0.027
(0.018)
-2.01***
(0.65)

-1.26**
(0.60)

-52777.0***
(7732.0)

-42868.0***
(10681.0)

-120480.0***
(6212.3)

-118050.0***
(6047.5)

-38827.0***
(6508.8)

-49805.0***
(10608.0)

-105910.0***
(5507.5)

-104980.0***
(5537.2)

283
48
0.75

147
25
0.67

235
49
0.79

235
49
0.85

283
48
0.78

147
25
0.74

235
49
0.84

235
49
0.84

Significance codes: p<0.001 ‘***’ p<0.01 ‘**’ p<0.05 ‘*’

Standard errors in parentheses

GDP = per capital GDP, Income = per capital personal income

Innovativeness score:
Innovativeness 1 = incentive oriented programs & program count, Innovativeness 2 = entrepreneurial programs & program count
Innovativeness 3 = incentive oriented & per capita program spending, Innovativeness 4 = entrepreneurial & per capita program spending
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Innovativeness 1 (-2)

(1)
GDP
Fixed
6.72***
(2.05)

Table 3.9: Model diagnostics for economic growth and innovativeness of program types (Table 3.8)

F test for individual effects
Within vs.
Within
Pooling model
p<0.001
Time-fixed
Significant
effects
time effect*
P<0.001

Hausman Test for Panel models
Fixed vs.
Fixed
Random effect
p<0.001
Regression
based
Hausman test

(Model 2)

(Model 3)

(Model 4)

Within
p<0.001
Significant
time effect*
P<0.001

Within
p<0.001
Significant
time effect*
P<0.001

Within
p<0.001
Significant
time effect*
P<0.001

Fixed
p<1

Fixed
p<0.001

Fixed
p<0.001
Model is not
inconsistent
p<0.001

(Model 2)

(Model 3)

(Model 4)

Within
Within
Within
Within
p<0.001
p<0.001
p<0.001
p<0.001
Significant Significant Significant Significant
time effect* time effect* time effect* time effect*
P<0.001
P<0.001
P<0.001
P<0.001

Fixed
p<0.001

Fixed
p<0.001

Fixed
p<0.001

Fixed
p<0.001

Model is
Model is
Model is
Model is
not
not
not
not
inconsistent inconsistent inconsistent inconsistent
p<0.01
p<0.001
p<0.001
p<0.001
RegressionModel is not Model is not Model is not Model is not
Model is
Model is
Model is
Model is
based
inconsistent inconsistent inconsistent inconsistent
not
not
not
not
Hausman test,
p<0.001
p<0.001
p<0.001
p<0.001
inconsistent inconsistent inconsistent inconsistent
vcov: vcovHC
p<0.001
p<0.001
p<0.001
p<0.001
* As the data is an unbalanced panel, the models do not account for time effects
.

Model is not Model is not Model is not
inconsistent inconsistent inconsistent
p<0.001
p<0.001
p<0.001

(Model 1)
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(Model 1)

3.5 Program category
As shown in Table 3.5, incentive oriented programs are broadly two types: tax incentives
and business finances. Tax incentives are provided in a number of ways, namely as tax credits,
tax exemptions, and tax deductions. For the purpose of analyzing program categories, I have
used broadly tax credits and tax exemptions. A tax credit is an incentive equal to the amount of
tax for an income, whereas, a tax exemption discounts certain incomes as taxable income.
Therefore, a tax credit is higher in amount than the exempted amount of tax. I have categorized
tax deductions, tax rebates, etc. under tax exemptions as they are closer to a tax exemption than a
tax credit. Another category of incentives is business financing. There are direct and indirect
business financing. Direct financing is provided directly from the state government to incentive
recipients. But, indirect financing uses an intermediate party (typically banks and relevant
financial institutions) to channel the incentive from the government to business recipients. To
keep the analysis simple, I have merged the direct and indirect business financing. These
business finances can have several types such as grants, loans, business equity, and so on. The
government also helps the businesses with the mechanisms of these financing methods such as
getting loans from a third party, getting loans for a preferential rate, etc. Finally, community
financing is provided to the local government body that implements projects to promote business
entrepreneurship by infrastructural improvement, technical assistance, informational assistance,
and the like (Table 3.10). These projects can also come as a grant, loan, or logistic support. The
tax incentives, business finances, and community finance programs can overlap as well (Figure
3.7). Most of the community finance projects come as business finance (77 out of 145). Again,
there are some programs (24) that fall under both tax incentives and business finances. However,
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most of the programs are business finances, followed by tax incentive and community finances,
which is only 7% of all programs.

Table 3.10: Examples of community projects
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

City streets
County highways
State highways
Drainage, water supply and flood control
Educational, cultural and social facilities
Environmental mitigation measures
Goods movement-related infrastructure
Parks and recreational facilities
Port facilities, public transit

10. Power and communications facilities
11. Public Transit
12. Sewage collection and treatment
13. Solid waste collection and disposal
14. Water treatment and distribution
15. Defense conversion
16. Public safety facilities
17. Military infrastructure
18. Industrial, utility and commercial

Figure 3.7: Venn diagram of overlapping programs among tax incentives, business finances and
community finances
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I use the same method to compute innovativeness of tax incentive, business finance, and
community finance as innovativeness of incentive-oriented and entrepreneurial programs. I use
program start year to determine the experience of the state with the program and cumulative
count of the programs to determine the diffusion of the program within the state. Figure 3.8
presents diffusion characteristics of tax incentive and business finance programs and their
comparisons. The diffusion of community finance projects is same as the diffusion of
entrepreneurial programs presented in Figure 3.6. Tax incentives started in Utah in 1933 and
business finance started in Pennsylvania in 1939. Today South Carolina and Kansas have the
most tax incentive programs (55 each), although Kansas has more experience running since 1976
than South Carolina running since 1999. Among the big states, Texas and California have among
the lowest numbers of tax incentive programs: five and eight respectively. Pennsylvania,
Massachusetts, and Maryland are among the states that have high number of business finance
projects, 59, 57, and 47 respectively. Business finance programs have been common in states
since the 1950s. States that have many business finance programs started the programs earlier
than the states that have less. I compute innovativeness for these three broad program categories.
Computation and summary statistics are presented in Table 3.11. However, innovation does not
necessarily happen at the broad level of the categories; rather, it happens at the level of program
type in order to address new and changing demand from businesses (Please see Appendix Table
A.1 for programs and the business needs they address). I do not account for innovativeness
beyond these categories in this work because that will require developing a categorization
scheme and future studies may look into finer levels of innovation. Nonetheless, I regress
economic growth on these three broad categories to see their influence on economic growth.
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5

28
Program count: 55

36

12
Program count: 42

Figure 3.8: Diffusion and count in 2020 of Tax incentive programs starting 1933 (above) and
business finance programs starting 1939 (below)
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Table 3.11: Summary statistics of major program categories for Years between 2008 and 2019
Years Tax Incentive is active for
(TT)
Cumulative count of Tax Incentives
(CT)
Innovativeness score for Tax
Incentives (TT×CT)
Years Business Finance is active for
(TB)
Cumulative count of Business
Finance (CB)
Innovativeness score for Business
Finance (TB×CB)
Years Community Finance is active
for (TC)
Cumulative count of Community
Finance (CC)
Innovativeness score for
Community Finance (TC×CC)

Min

1st Qrt

Median

Mean

3rd Qrt

Max

0

21

30

30.5

36

88

0

6

10

12.87

17

48

0

152.0

357.0

437.0

591.0

1692.0

0

27

37

38.7

50.3

82

0

7

10

12.8

17

46

0

203.0

384.5

586.7

650.0

3772.0

0

10.3

21.5

20.3

29

46

0

0

1

1.6

3

7

0

16.3

36.5

49.9

77.5

175.0

I regress per capita GDP and per capita personal income on innovativeness based on
count measures for tax incentives, business finances, and community finances. I did not use
spending based measures for this analysis because of the categorization issues. I present the
results in Table 3.12 and model diagnostics in Table 3.13. All but Model 3 are fixed effect
models. I find statistically significant estimates for economic growth and innovativeness of tax
incentive and business finance programs. I find that a one-unit increase in innovativeness of
incentives may increase per capita GDP and personal income by over $10, which is over $7 for
innovativeness in business finance programs. I find no significant estimate for community
finance. Part of this may be due to a lack of data as only 25 states have community finance
programs in the dataset. Nonetheless, I find all positive estimates for the relationship between
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economic growth and innovativeness of tax incentives, business finances, and community
finances.
This chapter deals with economic growth and policy diffusion. The innovativeness score
embeds the characteristics of diffusion both across various states and within each state. The
innovativeness score used accounts for the experience of a state with using a policy. The higher
the experience the higher their innovativeness score. This experience, in other words, accounts
for the level of diffusion of a policy. A policy that has been adopted more times is a more
diffusive policy. Again, I also account for within state diffusion by taking account of how many
programs have been adopted in the state. I find that the more policy diffusion of innovative
policies, the more economic growth. It is true for two types of innovativeness and diffusion
measures: 1) program count based measures and 2) program spending based measures. It is also
true for various types of programs such as incentive oriented and entrepreneurial programs.
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Table 3.12: Linear regression for GDP and Personal Income on Innovativeness of major program categories

Per capita state funding on higher
education (-2)
Per capita R&D expenditure in the state
(-2)
Waged and salaried employments per
thousands of population
State government ideology (-2)
Innovativeness for tax programs (-2) *
state ideology (-2)
Innovativeness for business finance (-2)
* state ideology (-2)
Innovativeness for community finance
(-2) * state ideology (-2)
Overall Intercept

(2)
GDP
Fixed

(3)
GDP
Random

(4)
Income
Fixed
12.07***
(2.39)

7.37***
(2.28)

11.93***
(4.26)
3.97**
(1.57)
245.08***
(84.57)
234.60***
(17.97)
-67.43**
(31.97)
0.20***
(0.060)

-67303.0***
(8526.6)
Observations
225
Number of states
39
Adjusted R-squared
0.66
Significance codes: p<0.001 ‘***’ p<0.01 ‘**’ p<0.05 ‘*’
Standard errors in parentheses

(6)
Income
Fixed

7.45***
(1.97)

9.67***
(3.72)

26.59
(32.26)
8.09*
(4.53)

7.31***
(1.21)
230.99***
(79.79)
202.53***
(16.86)
-76.02***
(27.65)

5.93***
(1.69)
459.85***
(114.34)
182.34***
(22.45)
-78.39**
(36.40)

14.04***
(3.73)
3.01**
(1.37)
226.56***
(74.16)
184.36***
(15.75)
-67.97**
(28.03)
0.17***
(0.052)

0.14***
(0.041)

-53651.0
(8066.6)
283
48
0.67

(5)
Income
Fixed

16.08***
(3.21)

38.89
(28.52)
19.37***
(5.01)

6.33***
(1.04)
193.43***
(68.89)
158.23***
(14.56)
-80.79***
(23.88)

7.69***
(1.62)
185.75*
(100.22)
173.01***
(22.22)
-58.83*
(31.32)

0.14***
(0.035)
2.01***
(0.73)
-42868.0***
(10681.0)
147
25
0.67

-50573.0**
(7477.4)
225
39
0.67

-39864.0***
(6964.7)
283
48
0.70

2.14***
(0.64)
-49805.0***
(10608.0)
147
25
0.68
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Innovativeness score for tax incentives
(-2)
Innovativeness score for business
finance (-2)
Innovativeness score for community
finance (-2)
Per capita federal funding on
transportation (-2)

(1)
GDP
Fixed
10.93***
(2.72)

(Model 1)

(Model 2)

(Model 3)

(Model 4)

(Model 5)

(Model 6)

F test for individual effects
Within vs.
Within
Pooling model
p<0.001
Time-fixed
Significant
effects
time effect*
P<0.001

Within
p<0.001
Significant
time effect*
P<0.001

Within
p<0.001
Significant
time effect*
P<0.001

Within
p<0.001
Significant
time effect*
P<0.001

Within
p<0.001
Significant
time effect*
P<0.001

Within
p<0.001
Significant
time effect*
P<0.001

Hausman Test for Panel models
Fixed vs.
Fixed
Random effect
p<0.001

Fixed
p<0.001

Fixed
p<1

Fixed
p<0.001

Fixed
p<0.001

Fixed
p<0.001

Regression
Model is not Model is not Model is not Model is not Model is not Model is not
based Hausman
inconsistent
inconsistent
inconsistent
inconsistent inconsistent inconsistent
test
p<0.001
p<0.001
p<0.001
p<0.001
p<0.01
p<0.001
RegressionModel is not Model is not Model is not Model is not Model is not Model is not
based Hausman
inconsistent
inconsistent
inconsistent
inconsistent inconsistent inconsistent
test, vcov:
p<0.001
p<0.001
p<0.001
p<0.001
p<0.001
p<0.001
vcovHC
* As the data is an unbalanced panel, the models do not account for time effects.
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Table 3.13: Model diagnostics for economic growth and program categories (Table 3.12)

CHAPTER 4
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICIES, EFFECTIVENESS AND SPILLOVER

In this chapter, I examine whether entrepreneurial policies and incentive-oriented policies
contribute to economic growth. For entrepreneurial policies, I examine if they positively impact
economic growth and for incentive-oriented policies I examine if they contribute to leakage from
the economy. Basically, entrepreneurial policies should contribute to economic growth because
they are adopted according to the concurrent market demand. They have to be innovative in
order to be able to address new demands in the market. Therefore, they should contribute to
economic growth. On the other hand, incentive-oriented policies are adopted to recruit industrial
branch plants in the states, so the revenue the branch plants generate may not stay in the host
state, rather the revenue may flow elsewhere, such as where the headquarters are or where new
investments may happen. Therefore, incentive-oriented policies should contribute to leakage
from the state’s economy.

4.1 Entrepreneurial policy and economic growth
Entrepreneurial policy promotes innovation in product developments and industrial
processes leading to economic growth within the state (Figure 4.1). Entrepreneurial policies are
meant for addressing new demands of the market; therefore, they have to be innovative.
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Entrepreneurship capital is a kind of social capital that promotes knowledge spill over, diversity,
and competition and work within the social capital to increase economic performance
(Audretsch, Keilbach, and Lehmann 2006). Entrepreneurship capital increases knowledge spill
over by introducing startup firms. It generates a variety of firms with new and competitive ideas
and products. It also generates substantial competitions amongst the firms that exist and that are
potential as the new firms need to bring in a new product, service, or idea. Knowledge spillover
(Acs et al. 2004), diversity (Winter and Nelson 1982), and competition (Porter 1990) influence
economic performance. This model assumes that regardless of innovativeness of the policy
adoption, entrepreneurial policies contribute to economic growth because they promote
innovation in industrial processing, finance systems, and technological development. With this, I
hypothesize that entrepreneurial policies increase economic growth (H2). In Chapter 3, we see
that innovativeness of entrepreneurial programs leads to economic growth. In this Chapter, I
examine whether adoption of entrepreneurial programs (regardless of innovativeness) leads to
economic growth. The models for H2 will use all variables from models for H1 presented in
Table 3.1 and 3.3 in Chapter 3, and with the additional of interactions of entrepreneurial-ness of
the policies and their innovativeness and survival.

Entrepreneurial
programs

Innovation

Instate economic growth

Incentive-oriented
programs

Emulation

Spillover economic growth

Figure 4.1: Hypothesized link among policy, diffusion, and economic growth
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics of variables for H2 for years between 2008 and 2020

Per capita GDP ($)
Per capita personal
income ($)
Cumulative count of
entrepreneurial programs
Per capita spending on
entrepreneurial programs
($)
Per capita program
spending ($) (E)
Per capita federal
funding on transportation
Per capita state funding
on higher education
Per capita R&D
expenditure in the state
Waged and salaried
employments per
thousands of population
State government
ideology

Minimum
31602

1st
Quartile
43783

Mean
52348

3rd
Quartile
59136

Median
50545

Maximum
91057

29855

39260

44372

45577

50770

77289

0

0

1

1.63

3

7

0

3.5

7.6

19.7

17.5

367.9

2.1

14.8

25.4

44.3

45.1

427.7

3.6

117.8

154.5

192.6

200.8

1640.5

66.1

369.8

713.3

774.8

1062.8

2380.7

0.17

2.5

4.5

6.0

8.1

24.7

385.6

436.5

464.6

467.4

493.6

650.6

17.5

26.9

44.5

44.1

61.1

73.6

I regress per capita GDP and personal income on entrepreneurial programs. I use countbased and spending-based measures and a lagged period of two years. Summary statistics of the
variables are presented in Table 4.1. Table 4.2 presents the results of the models. I find that
entrepreneurial programs increase economic growth in the count-based models. I find that one
additional entrepreneurial program may increase $1,874 of per capita GDP and $2,071 of per
capita personal income. I find no statistically significant estimates for spending-based measures.
As discussed in section 3.4, the spending-based measure has some issues relate to categorization,
which can possibly be the reason behind the null findings. I apply an alternative categorization
scheme for spending-based measure and find a positive estimate for per capita GDP. This
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suggests that a finer categorization of the spending functions should improve the model output.
The alternative scheme is presented in Appendix: Table A.2 and A.3.

Table 4.2: Regression for GDP and personal income on entrepreneurial programs
(Model 1)
Per capita
GDP

(Model 2)
Per capita
GDP

Cumulative count of
1873.80**
entrepreneurial programs (-2)
(865.37)
Per capita spending on
-5.30
entrepreneurial programs (-2)
(26.67)
Per capita federal funding on
13.56***
0.15
transportation (-2)
(4.45)
(1.75)
Per capita state funding on
7.92***
2.62***
higher education (-2)
(1.47)
(0.80)
Per capita R&D expenditure
305.34***
27.11
in the state (-2)
(94.83)
(47.42)
Waged and salaried
253.24***
350.68***
employments per thousands
(19.39)
(8.89)
of population
State government ideology (-55.75
-25.80*
2)
(35.80)
(14.84)
Program count (-2)* state
18.74
ideology(-2)
(16.50)
Program spending (-2)* state
-0.13
ideology(-2)
(0.45)
Overall Intercept
-77379.0*** -110940.0***
(9230.4)
(4402.5)
Observations
287
450
Number of states
49
50
Adjusted R-squared
0.60
0.80
Significance codes: p<0.001 ‘***’ p<0.01 ‘**’ p<0.05 ‘*’
Standard errors in parentheses
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(Model 3)
Per capita
Personal
Income
2070.98***
(775.55)

19.54***
(3.99)
6.81***
(1.32)
272.05***
(84.99)
207.30***
(17.37)
-62.34*
(32.09)
22.58
(14.79)

-62964.0***
(8272.4)
287
49
0.54

(Model 4)
Per capita
Personal
Income

-6.01
(26.84)
1.97
(1.76)
1.21
(0.80)
145.22***
(47.72)
305.32***
(8.95)
-36.36**
(14.93)

-0.62
(0.46)
-95489.0***
(4430.7)
450
50
0.79

4.2 Industrial recruitment policies and spillover economic growth
Industrial recruitment policies bring out-of-state firms in the home state but the savings
made from these firms move to other states leading to leakage in the economy of the home state
(Figure 4.1). This model will see the relationship between industrial recruitment incentives and
state-level leakage of income and industrial output. Doeksen and Little (1967) propose a measure
to estimate regional leakage using an input-output table. An input-output table portrays the
amount of interindustrial flow of goods and services. Leakage is measured using an
interindustrial transfer multiplier and the state’s net export-import balance. First, a technical
input-output scenario is developed assuming that the host region is independent and receives no
imported goods and services. Second, an interdependent input-output table is generated
considering the changes in multipliers for the net export-import balance. Finally, leakage is
calculated by deducting multipliers of the technical table from the interdependent table (Doeksen
and Little 1967). In order to estimate the leakage, a modified input-output table is needed that
represents input-output flow without any imports. After preparing the modified table,
interdependent multipliers are computed from the original and modified tables. To estimate
leakage, multipliers in the modified table are subtracted from the original level. Leakage happens
when the change of economic activity in one state causes change in other states. I compute
industrial multipliers from the national level industrial input-output flow (available from the
BEA) and apply them to states based on the location quotient value for 19 aggregated industrial
sectors of each state. I hypothesize that, as out-of-state firms are more likely to transfer earnings
out of the host state and less likely to reinvest in the host-state, industrial recruitment policies
should increase leakage (H3).
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Table 4.3 : Main variables and data sources for H3
Dependent
variables

Variables
Output leakage

Independent
variables

Incentive oriented
programs

Control Variables

GDP
Cluster Strength

Unionization

Data Source and computation
Computation from national direct requirement table
from Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and
annual location quotient data for states from Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS)
BEA:
https://www.bea.gov/data/industries/input-outputaccounts-data
BLS : https://www.bls.gov/cew/downloadable-datafiles.htm
Council for Community and Economic Research
(C2ER)
BEA
Harvard Business School Cluster Mapping Project:
https://clustermapping.us/data/report/region/scoreca
rd#/state/48/1998/2018/cluster_strength
Harvard Business School Cluster Mapping Project:
https://clustermapping.us/data/report/region/scoreca
rd#/state/32/2001/2019/unionization

4.2.1 Computation of leakage
For the computation of leakage, I use national level input-output multipliers for the direct
requirements (Table 4.4). In the input-output table, the multiplier is calculated in a way where
total input is equal to total output. The requirement table shows how much input each sector
requires from the own sector to produce a one unit of output. For example, in Table 4.4,
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting has a direct requirement of 0.28, which means, in
order to produce $1 of output, it uses 28 cents of its own input. So, the remaining 72 cents of
inputs come from other industries. For manufacturing, the requirement is 1.44, which is over
one, meaning that manufacturing does not need input (grossly) from other sectors rather,
manufacturing provides input to other sectors more than what it needs for itself.
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Table 4.4: National direct requirement for various industries for 2019
Industry
code
(BEA)

Industry title (BEA)

Industry
code (BLS)
(NAICS)

11

Agriculture, forestry,
fishing, and hunting

11

21

Mining

21

22
23
31G
42
44RT

Utilities
Construction
Manufacturing
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Transportation and
warehousing
Information
Finance, insurance, real
estate, rental, and leasing
Finance, insurance, real
estate, rental, and leasing
Professional and business
services

22
23
31-33
42
44-45

48TW
51
FIRE
FIRE
PROF
PROF
PROF
6

6

7

7

81

Professional and business
services
Professional and business
services
Educational services,
health care, and social
assistance
Educational services,
health care, and social
assistance
Arts, entertainment,
recreation,
accommodation, and food
services
Arts, entertainment,
recreation,
accommodation, and food
services
Other services, except
government

Industry title (BLS)
(NAICS)

Direct
requirement

51

Agriculture, forestry,
fishing and hunting
Mining, quarrying, and
oil and gas extraction
Utilities
Construction
Manufacturing
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Transportation and
warehousing
Information

0.294015

52

Finance and insurance

1.21104

48-49

Real estate and rental
and leasing
Professional and
technical services
Management of
companies and
enterprises
Administrative and
waste services

53
54
55
56

0.279356
0.214851
0.175178
0.088475
1.442441
0.402224
0.103634
0.452069

1.21104
1.391921
1.391921
1.391921

61

Educational services

0.038438

62

Health care and social
assistance

0.038438

71

Arts, entertainment,
and recreation

0.155003

72

Accommodation and
food services

0.155003

81

Other services, except
public administration

0.109303

79

For the computation of leakage from the state’s economy, I need state level requirements.
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) has a department named Regional Input-Output
Modeling Systems (RIMSII) that computes state level requirements. However, they do not have
time series data for state requirements. Based on their user manual and email correspondence
with the responsible personnel for the computation of state level requirements, I learned they use
state level location quotients (LQ) based on wages from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
and national level direct requirements to calculate state level requirements. Therefore, I compute
state level requirements based on LQ for both wages and employment and apply those to
national level direct requirements (Table 4.5). As an example, Table 4.5 shows the state level
requirement for 19 industrial sectors for Alabama for 2019. A location quotient of 0.74 for
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting means the concentration of this industry in Alabama is
74% in comparison to the national average concentration. When the value is over one, it means
the concentration is higher in the state than the national average. From Table 4.5, wage based LQ
for Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting industry is 1.03, meaning that Alabama has slightly
higher wages than the national average for this industry. Similarly, for employment based LQ for
manufacturing, 1.57 means Alabama has 157% more employment in manufacturing than the
national average of employment in manufacturing. So, when I multiply the national requirement
which is indicative of overall input-output requirements with state level concentrations, I find
how much the state requires from itself. Therefore, from Table 4.5, I interpret the requirement as
Alabama requires $0.21 of input from the Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting industry of
Alabama to produce $1 of output in this industry. As the input should be equal to the output, the
rest of the input comes from other industries inside or outside of Alabama. Therefore, the
remaining input is the leakage from the industry. For Alabama’s agriculture, forestry, fishing,
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and hunting industry the leakage is 79 cents (employment based) or 71 cents (wage based) for
every $1 of output.

Table 4.5: Location quotient (LQ) and state level requirements for Alabama for 2019

Industry title
Agriculture, forestry, fishing
and hunting
Mining, quarrying, and oil and
gas extraction
Utilities
Construction
Manufacturing
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Transportation and
warehousing
Information
Finance and insurance
Real estate and rental and
leasing
Professional and technical
services
Management of companies and
enterprises
Administrative and waste
services
Educational services
Health care and social
assistance
Arts, entertainment, and
recreation
Accommodation and food
services
Other services, except public
administration
Average

LQ based on
annual
average
employment

LQ
based
on total
annual
wages

State
requirement (LQ
employment X
Direct
requirement)

State
requirement
(LQ wages X
Direct
requirement

0.74

1.03

0.206723

0.287736

0.7
1.81
0.94
1.57
0.94
1.1

0.66
2.3
0.98
1.59
0.98
1.16

0.150396
0.317073
0.083167
2.264632
0.37809
0.113997

0.141802
0.40291
0.086706
2.293481
0.394179
0.120215

0.83
0.56
0.88

0.93
0.35
0.75

0.375217
0.164648
1.065716

0.420424
0.102905
0.90828

0.77

0.72

0.932501

0.871949

0.84

0.82

1.169214

1.141375

0.5

0.5

0.695961

0.695961

1.02
0.49

0.89
0.43

1.41976
0.018834

1.23881
0.016528

0.81

0.92

0.031134

0.035363

0.65

0.39

0.100752

0.060451

0.99

0.93

0.153452

0.144152

0.77

0.9

0.084163
0.515604

0.098373
0.497979

81

In order to get the overall state level requirements, I summed all industry level state
requirements and divided the sum by 19 (the number of total industrial sectors) to get an average
state requirement for all industries (Table 4.6). Table 4.6 shows Alabama’s overall requirement
from industries outside the state for 2000 to 2019. So, for 2000, a requirement value of 0.47
(employment based) means Alabama requires 47% of its own input therefore the rest is leaked
out of the economy. Again, for 2019, this employment-based leakage is 48.81% computed from
(1 – 0.511865) * 100 = 0.488135 * 100 = 48.81%. I calculate leakage this way for all states from 2000 to
2019, and use this variable to test my hypothesis that incentive oriented programs increase leakage.

Table 4.6: Average State requirements for Alabama

Year
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019

Sum of state
requirement
(employment
based)
9.014784
9.152895
8.978587
9.033626
9.058043
9.391027
9.347522
9.43726
9.611132
9.12296
9.408992
9.58073
9.720982
9.648082
9.796484
9.80909
9.778271
9.707065
9.792281
9.72543

Sum of state
requirement
(wage based)
8.618571
8.791054
8.579453
8.760214
8.716084
8.986746
8.894037
8.950506
9.129673
8.643019
8.963893
9.114785
9.245719
9.196487
9.37904
9.370754
9.386878
9.351674
9.516411
9.4616
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Average state
requirement
(employment
based)
0.474462
0.481731
0.472557
0.475454
0.476739
0.494265
0.491975
0.496698
0.505849
0.480156
0.49521
0.504249
0.511631
0.507794
0.515604
0.516268
0.514646
0.510898
0.515383
0.511865

Average state
requirement (wage
based)
0.453609
0.462687
0.45155
0.461064
0.458741
0.472987
0.468107
0.471079
0.480509
0.454896
0.471784
0.479726
0.486617
0.484026
0.493634
0.493198
0.494046
0.492193
0.500864
0.497979

4.2.2 Variables and Model
My dependent variable for this hypothesis is leakage from the state’s economy and the
main explanatory variable is the number of and spending on incentive-oriented programs in the
state. Table 4.7 shows summary statistics of the variables used in the model to test this
hypothesis. My main independent variables are the count-based measure and the spending-based
measure of incentive-oriented programs. For the count-based measure I use cumulative count of
incentive oriented programs relative to all programs in the state. I use a cumulative count
because all these programs are still active in the state. Therefore, a program starting in an earlier
year still should have impact in the current year if it is active. For the spending measure, the
value is the yearly expenditures on incentive-oriented programs. I use a per capita measure so
that it can be comparable across states. I use four control variables: size of the economy,
industrial composition, labor share, and state government’s ideology in the model. Size of the
economy should explain leakage because a larger economy is more likely to have investments in
more variety of sectors within the economy causing a low rate of leakage from the economy. I
use GDP as a proxy for the size of the economy. Industrial composition is related to whether the
economy has a concentration of related industries that share input and output between
themselves. If there is a higher concentration of related industries, leakage should be less, as the
industries will need less input coming from the outside of the economy. I use cluster strength as
the proxy of industrial composition. This cluster strength data comes from the Cluster Mapping
Project of Harvard Business School. The cluster strength means how much employment is
involved in the traded activities within the main cluster of the economy of a state. This means if
there is a higher traded employment, there should be a higher chance of getting more revenue
from outside of the state. It implies that the revenue from exports outside the state can have a
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higher chance of outweighing the spending for inputs outside the state. Therefore, higher cluster
strength should decrease leakage. The cluster strength of each state will be discussed in more
detail in Chapter 5. I also use labor strength as a control variable. However, labor strength may
be related to leakage depending on the type of the industry. For labor intensive industries, labor
strength should decrease leakage because the industry will hire more from instate workers.
However, for capital intensive industries, the labor strength variable may not be related. I do not
have a category for labor vs. capital intensity of the industries. So, this variable separately may
not explain anything but its impact on the overall model is addressed by using this variable. I
have used unionization as a proxy of the labor strength. I also use ideology as a control variable.
Similar to unionization, liberal policies should be more beneficial to labor and may have an
impact on the labor-intensive industries. Again, liberal policies that involve environmental
regulation may affect the profitability of the capital-intensive manufacturing industries.
Conservative policies that involve more deregulation should benefit the industries regardless of
the type. I also use an interaction of ideology and program to see how ideology and program
choice may have a role to play in the model.
The results in Table 4.8 show incentive-oriented programs increase leakage. I find
significant estimates for the count-based measures but no significant estimates for the spendingbased measures but the estimates are in the right direction. I find size of the economy and cluster
strength always decrease leakage. However, cluster strength is not statistically significant. I also
find unionization to increase leakage (although not significant) and ideology to increase leakage
(significant in the count-based measures). These results suggest liberal policies increase leakage,
although I did not find statistical significance in the spending-based models. However, an
interaction of ideology and program choice always decreases leakage. I find this estimate
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statistically significant for all but Model 4. I also do diagnostics for the models and variables
(Table 4.9). I find a within model with state effects more suitable than a pooling model with all
states together. I also find models for fixed state effects are more suitable than random effect
models. The variables are robust as diagnosed by the Hausman test both in terms of regression
based and covariance-based tests.

Table 4.7: Summary statistics of variables for modeling leakage and incentive-oriented programs
for years between 2008 and 2020
Mean

3rd
Quartile

Maximum

46.5

47.2

49.9

63.2

44.5

47.2

47.9

50.6

62.5

2

15

24

25.45

33

72

2

16

25

27.1

34

75

0.7

0.9

1.0

0.9

1.0

1.0

0.6
25668

11.0
83410

18.4
207485

30.1
343372

29.2
414926

254.3
3132801

Industrial composition
(cluster strength (%))
Unionization (%)

11
1.5

27.1
5.1

38.1
9.2

38.0
9.4

49.2
12.8

68.7
22.8

State government
ideology

17.6

26.9

44.6

44.1

61.1

73.6

Leakage (%) based on
employment
Leakage (%) based on
wage
Cumulative count of
incentive oriented
programs
Cumulative count of
incentive oriented and
entrepreneurial programs
Cumulative Number of
incentive oriented
programs relative to all
programs
Per capita Spending on
incentive oriented
programs ($)
Current GDP ($M)

Minimum

1st
Quartile

Median

19.4

44.0

24.0
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Table 4.8: Regression for leakage on incentive oriented programs.

Cumulative count of
incentive programs relative
to all programs (t-2)
Per capita spending on
incentive oriented programs
(t-2)
Size of the economy (log of
GDP) (t-2)
Industrial composition
(cluster strength (%))

(Model 1)
Leakage
based on
employment
26.96**
(10.94)

(Model 2)
Leakage
based on
employment

(Model 3)
Leakage
based on
wages
29.71**
(11.58)

0.014
(0.015)

(Model 4)
Leakage
based on
wages

0.008
(0.016)

-7.59***
(1.36)
-0.034
(0.022)

-10.22***
(0.91)
-0.007
(0.013)

-6.18***
(1.45)
-0.026
(0.023)

-8.82***
(0.97)
-0.003
(0.014)

Unionization (%)

0.18
(0.14)

0.010
(0.091)

0.16
(0.15)

0.044
(0.096)

State ideology (t-2)

0.19**
(0.084)

0.018
(0.012)

0.45**
(0.19)

0.019
(0.013)

State ideology * program
count

-0.20**
(0.095)

-0.46**
(0.20)

State ideology * program
spending

-0.0005*
(0.0003)

Overall Intercept

113.27***
170.77***
(21.01)
(11.46)
Observations
266
397
Number of states
49
50
R-squared
0.22
0.34
Significance codes: p<0.001 ‘***’ p<0.01 ‘**’ p<0.05 ‘*’
Standard errors in parentheses
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-0.0004
(0.0003)
93.92***
(22.23)
266
49
0.17

153.96***
(12.15)
397
50
0.26

Table 4.9: Model diagnostics for leakage and incentive-oriented programs (Table 4.8)

F test for individual effects
Within vs. Pooling model
Time-fixed effects

(Model 1)

(Model 2)

(Model 3)

(Model 4)

Within
p<0.001
Significant
time effect*
P<0.001

Within
p<0.001
Significant
time effect*
P<0.001

Within
p<0.001
Significant
time effect*
P<0.001

Within
p<0.001
Significant
time effect*
P<0.001

Fixed
p<0.001

Fixed
p<0.1

Fixed
p<0.001

Hausman Test for Panel models
Fixed vs. Random effect

Fixed
p<0.001

Regression based Hausman
test

Model is not Model is not
Model is not
inconsistent
inconsistent
inconsistent
p<0.001
p<0.001
p<0.001
Regression-based Hausman Model is not Model is not
Model is not
test, vcov: vcovHC
inconsistent
inconsistent
inconsistent
p<0.001
p<0.001
p<0.01
* As the data is an unbalanced panel, the models do not account for time effects.

Model is not
inconsistent
p<0.001
Model is not
inconsistent
p<0.001

This chapter examines the effect of entrepreneurial and incentive-oriented policies on the
economic performance of the states. As entrepreneurial policies help business startups, they need
to be innovative with respect to the concurrent demand in the market. As they address the
demand in the market, they increase economic growth. I find statistically significant evidence
that entrepreneurial policies increase economic performance. On the other hand, industrial
recruitment policies are meant for recruiting branch plants of reputed firms that have operations
and headquarters in other states. Although those firms operate in one state, the revenue they
generate can move to other states. Leakage is the measure to show how much of the intermediate
input each industry receives from outside the economy. This intermediate input gets leaked from
the economy. As industrial recruitment policies encourage branch plants that are more likely to
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bring intermediate inputs from outside the economy, they increase leakage. I find statistically
significant evidence that industrial recruitment policies increase leakage.
However, I do not find any statistically significant estimates for the measures that are
based on program spending. This is probably due, in part, on the way I define entrepreneurial
programs in the spending dataset. The dataset does not have recorded information for
entrepreneurial policies exclusively. Therefore, there are overlaps of incentive oriented and
entrepreneurial spending in the dataset. At the moment, the spending measure is not very reliable
as there are overlaps but if with separated entrepreneurial spending data the spending measure
should bring more reliable estimates. In this chapter, I tested the hypotheses using spending data
in the model. With more specific data, these models can produce more reliable estimates.
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CHAPTER 5
POLICYMAKING AND THE EFFECT OF INDUSTRIAL SPECIALIZATION

The strongest industry in a state is its best industrial specialization. However, a state can
have multiple industrial specializations. The size of agglomeration of related firms in an
industry defines the strength of the industry relative to that industry across the nation and relative
to other industries within the state. The bigger the size of the agglomeration for a particular
industry, the more specialized the host state is for that industry. I examine this specialization
relative to other states. This industrial specialization is also analyzed as “clusters of related
industries,” especially in the regional science literature. A cluster simply is the geographic
agglomeration of related industries. The geograhic agglomeration helps facilitate competition
among the related firms because they can share information and resources (Porter 1998). The
process of diffusion is also high withih a cluster. Policies that are adopted for a technolgy
clusteravailability of similar technology in an area or at a period of time diffuse at a higher
speed than average (Mallinson 2016). In other words, a cluster of industries adopts innovative
policies quickly. Adoption of one innovative policy influences adoption of other related policies
(Rogers 2003). Therefore, a cluster facilitates innovation, diffusion, and competion, which are all
important forces for economic performance. In order for the cluster to grow economically, it is
important that the government focus on the cluster characteristics and accordingly support more
R&D activities, more new venture projects, more scientific activities, and the like (Porter 1998).
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In this chapter, I examine if the state’s policy compatibility with its strong industries
influences economic growth in the state. I test the hypothesis that policies consistent with the
industry that a state specializes in should promote the state’s economic growth. To define
industrial specialization, I use a location quotient (LQ) value for each industry within a state. The
location quotient value indicates the concentration of an industry relative to the national average
concentration in a state in terms of employment or wage in that industry. This industrial
concentration is also described as clusters (U.S. Cluster Mapping Project 2020). Clusters are
geographic areas consisting of related firms that are connected to each other through some
forward and backward linkages. So, I examine if the economic development policies adopted by
a state support the cluster broadly and the cluster type particularly. I examine whether the states
adopt policies that are congruent to their cluster/industrial characteristics. I measure this
congruence by taking account of the industry target of the adopted policies. I count how many
policies have been targeted to each industry for each state by year. Then I apply the number of
policies targeted to an industry to the location quotient value of that industry to get a congruence
score for that industry. I do this for 19 industrial categories for each state. Finally, I get an
aggregate congruence score by summing up congruence scores for all industrial categories for
each state by year. With this aggregate congruence score, I test whether policy congruence, i.e.,
policy relevance to the industrial concentration of the state, increases economic growth. In short,
I hypothesize that policy congruence should increase economic growth (H4).
I use two dependent variables: GDP per capita and personal income per capita (Table
5.1). I have two main independent variables: congruence calculated with an employment based
LQ and that calculated with a wage based LQ. I use the following control variables: spending on
entrepreneurial programs, per capita federal funding on transportation, per capita state’s funding
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on education, R&D expenditures in the state, total employment in the state, and state ideology. I
also use an interaction term for the main independent variables and state ideology.

Table 5.1: Main variables and data sources for Hypothesis 4: policy congruence increase
economic growth
Dependent variables
Independent variables

Control Variables

Variables
GDP
Personal Income
Policy congruence: the
state’s target industries for
the adopted policies and it’s
industrial concentration
(LQ)

Entrepreneurial spending
Federal funding on
transportation
State funding on education
Employment
State Ideology

Data Source and computation
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
Target Industry: Council of
Community and Economic Research
(C2ER)
LQ: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Congruence = count of programs
targeted to an industry * LQ of that
industry
C2ER
NASBO
NASBO
BEA
(Berry et al. 2010)

5.1 Policy congruence
More specifically, policy congruence is meant for how related the policy adopted is to the
strong industries in the state. When an economic development policy is adopted in a state, the
policy is sometimes targeted to one or multiple industries. The C2ER data that I am using for
economic development policies has recorded 965 out of 2165 policies with a target industry. So,
I have 965 policies that have a target industry. Now I want to see if those policies are targeted to
an industry that is a strong industry in the state (Figure 5.1). Figure 5.1 shows the two top
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industries in each state with their respective location quotient value for 2019. The third top
industries in each state in 2019 is presented in the Appendix (Figure A.1). Figure 5.1 presents the
industrial concentration of the top two industries for 2019. Similarly, the data includes yearly
industrial concentration for 19 industrial categories by state. To identify the strength of the
industry, I use this location quotient value that denotes the relative concentration of an industry
in the state relative to the country (Table 5.2). I use this industrial strength to identify if the
policies adopted in the state is targeted to this strength. Table 5.2 presents an example for
Alabama for 2019 on how to calculate congruence. In Table 5.2, the employment based LQ for
agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting industry in 2019 for Alabama is 0.74. There was no
policy adopted targeting this industry in 2019 but there is one active program that has been
targeted to this industry. Therefore, the congruence value for this industry is 0.74 X 1 = 0.74.
Using this method, I have this congruence value for each industry. So, I sum up the congruence
values for all industries to get a final congruence score for the state for a year. I have program
data for 2008 to 2019, so, I have policy congruence for this 12-year period for all states. Table
5.3 shows an example for Alabama. I have no data for Alabama for 2008, 2010, 2013, and 20141.
So, those years are omitted from the model.

1

Only 45% of the programs have information on the target industries, therefore, there is not a congruence value
available in all state-years.
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Mining

Agriculture, forestry, fishing & hunting

Management of companies and enterprises

Utilities

Transportation and warehousing

Administrative and waste services

Construction

Information

Educational services

Manufacturing

Finance and insurance

Health care and social assistance

Wholesale trade

Real estate and rental and leasing

Arts, entertainment, and recreation

Retail trade

Professional and technical services

Accommodation and food services

Figure 5.1: Top industries in the American states in 2019 (above – top, below – second top).
Circle markers indicate location quotient for the respective industry in the state
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Table 5.2: Location quotient (LQ) and industry level policy congruence for Alabama for 2019
1
Industry title

2
LQ based
on annual
average
employment

3

4

5

LQ
Cumulative Congruence
based
program
(employment)
on total count
= Col 2 x
annual
Col 4
wages

6
Congruence
(Wage) =
Col 3 x
Col 4

Agriculture, forestry,
fishing and hunting

0.74

1.03

1

0.74

1.03

Mining, quarrying, and
oil and gas extraction

0.7

0.66

0

0

0

Utilities

1.81

2.3

0

0

0

Construction

0.94

0.98

0

0

0

Manufacturing

1.57

1.59

0

0

0

Wholesale trade

0.94

0.98

0

0

0

Retail trade

1.1

1.16

0

0

0

Transportation and
warehousing

0.83

0.93

3

2.49

2.79

Information

0.56

0.35

0

0

0

Finance and insurance

0.88

0.75

0

0

0

Real estate and rental and
leasing

0.77

0.72

0

0

0

Professional and
technical services

0.84

0.82

1

0.84

0.82

Management of
companies and
enterprises

0.5

0.5

0

0

0

Administrative and waste
services

1.02

0.89

0

0

0

Educational services

0.49

0.43

0

0

0

Health care and social
assistance

0.81

0.92

0

0

0

Arts, entertainment, and
recreation

0.65

0.39

0

0

0

Accommodation and
food services

0.99

0.93

0

0

0

Other services, except
public administration

0.77

0.9

0

0

0

4.07

4.64

Total
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Table 5.3: Congruence score for Alabama for 2008 - 2019
Year

Sum of congruence (employment based)

Sum of congruence (wage based)

2008

NA

NA

2009

2.62

2.68

2010

NA

NA

2011

3.32

3.73

2012

3.34

3.71

2013

NA

NA

2014

NA

NA

2015

3.3

3.71

2016

4.14

4.64

2017

4.08

4.61

2018

4.07

4.62

2019

4.07

4.64

Similar to the models in the previous chapters, I run linear regression for panel data
models with the above mentioned (Table 5.1) dependent, explanatory, and control variables.
Table 5.4 shows the summary statistics of the variables and Table 5.5 shows the model outputs. I
use a two-year lagged period for all the independent variables as I assume that there is a need for
a 2-year time for program level interventions and government ideology to make an impact on
economic growth. I did not use any lagged period for number of employments because I assume
that employment has an immediate impact on GDP and personal income. I use spending on
entrepreneurial programs as a control variable as discussed in the previous chapter that
entrepreneurial programs increase GDP. As discussed in the previous chapters, spending on
infrastructure, spending on worker skills, and number of employments directly influences GDP. I
use federal spending on transportation as a proxy for the infrastructure spending. I did not use the
state’s spending on infrastructure separately because that may cause a chance of duplication for
95

number of programs and spending on entrepreneurial programs might also include some
spending on infrastructure. I use state spending on higher education as a proxy for worker skill in
the state. I also use state ideology as a control variable because government’s choice on program
adoption may depend on the ideology of the government. I also use an interaction of ideology
and government’s policy choices to address any effect of the interaction in the model.

Table 5.4: Summary statistics of variables for modeling economic growth and policy congruence
for years between 2008 and 2020

Per capita GDP ($)
Per capita personal
income ($)
Policy congruence (LQ
employment)
Policy congruence (LQ
wages)
Per capita spending on
entrepreneurial programs
($)
Per capita federal
funding on transportation
Per capita state funding
on higher education
Per capita R&D funding
in the states
Waged and salaried
employments per
thousands of population
State government
ideology

Minimum
31602

1st
Quartile
43783

Mean
52348

3rd
Quartile
59136

Median
50545

Maximum
91057

29855

39260

44372

45577

50770

77289

0

6.89

16.6

21.3

33.0

108.6

0

7.1

16.7

21.7

34.2

120.8

0

3.5

7.6

19.7

17.5

367.9

3.6

117.8

154.5

192.6

200.8

1640.5

66.1

369.8

713.3

774.8

1062.8

2380.7

0.17

2.5

4.5

6.0

8.1

24.7

385.6

436.5

464.6

467.4

493.6

650.6

17.6

26.9

44.6

44.1

61.1

73.6
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Table 5.5: Regression for GDP and personal income on policy congruence
(Model 1)
Per capita
GDP
Policy congruence (LQ
employment) (-2)
Policy congruence (LQ
wages) (-2)
Per capita spending on
entrepreneurial programs (-2)
Per capita federal funding on
transportation (-2)
Per capita state funding on
higher education (-2)
Per capita R&D funding in
the state (-2)
Waged and salaried
employments per thousands
of population
State government ideology (2)
Policy congruence
employment (-2) * state
ideology(-2)
Policy congruence wages (2)* state ideology(-2)
Overall Intercept

(Model 2)
Per capita
GDP

150.08***
(43.42)
138.74***
(44.17)
26.59
(16.15)
1.23
(2.64)
1.04
(0.95)
-10.84
(66.14)
356.25***
(12.61)

27.61*
(15.90)
1.30
(2.59)
0.96
(0.94)
-6.98
(65.04)
353.59***
(12.49)
5.10
(23.86)
-0.70
(0.98)

4.17
(24.35)

-0.74
(1.00)
-114820.0*** -115810.0***
(6135.0)
(6205.1)
Observations
235
235
Number of states
49
49
Adjusted R-squared
0.87
0.86
Significance codes: p<0.001 ‘***’ p<0.01 ‘**’ p<0.05 ‘*’
Standard errors in parentheses

(Model 3)
Per capita
Personal
Income
159.96***
(35.06)

2.08
(12.83)
6.60***
(2.09)
1.15
(0.0.76)
109.40**
(52.52)
296.73***
(10.09)
-14.43
(19.27)
-0.19
(0.79)

-96362.0***
(4953.7)
235
49
0.89

(Model 4)
Per capita
Personal
Income

158.19***
(35.48)
2.14
(12.98)
6.19***
(2.13)
1.23
(0.77)
106.34**
(53.12)
298.96***
(10.13)
-13.02
(19.56)

-0.34
(0.80)
-97315.0***
(4984.3)
235
49
0.89

I find that policy congruence increases economic growth in the state (Table 5.5). For both
GDP and personal income and for both employment-based and wage-based congruence
measures, I find statistically significant estimates. The estimates suggest that a one unit increase
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in congruence should increase per capita economic growth by nearly $150. In other words, if a
state adopts one policy for an industry that has an LQ of one, per capita economic growth will
increase by $150, which is equivalent to adopting two policies for an industry that has an LQ of
0.5. The estimates for the control variables also seem to be in the right direction although not all
of them were found to be statistically significant.

Table 5.6: Model diagnostics for economic growth and policy congruence (Table 5.5)

F test for individual effects
Within vs. Pooling model
Time-fixed effects

(Model 1)

(Model 2)

(Model 3)

(Model 4)

Within
p<0.001
Significant
time effect*
P<0.001

Within
p<0.001
Significant
time effect*
P<0.001

Within
p<0.001
Significant
time effect*
P<0.001

Within
p<0.001
Significant
time effect*
P<0.001

Fixed
p<0.001

Fixed
p<0.001

Fixed
p<0.001

Hausman Test for Panel models
Fixed vs. Random effect

Fixed
p<0.001

Regression based Hausman
test

Model is not Model is not
Model is not
inconsistent
inconsistent
inconsistent
p<0.001
p<0.001
p<0.001
Regression-based Hausman Model is not Model is not
Model is not
test, vcov: vcovHC
inconsistent
inconsistent
inconsistent
p<0.001
p<0.001
p<0.001
* As the data is an unbalanced panel, the models do not account for time effects.

Model is not
inconsistent
p<0.001
Model is not
inconsistent
p<0.001

I run model diagnostics (Table 5.6) to see whether ‘within’ effects (the state’s fixed
effects) needs to be addressed, and I find that ‘within’ models are more appropriate for the data. I
also find there is a time-effect within the data, but I did not address time effect as the years of the
data is small, with a maximum of 12 years. I also test whether random effects need to be
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addressed. I find that fixed effect models are more suitable for the data. I also perform Hausman
tests to diagnose if the variables in the models are robust enough for the regression model and for
the data I have in terms of variable covariance and heteroskedasticity. I find that the variables I
choose are robust given the models used and given the characteristics of the data.
This chapter deals with examining which industries the policies should target in a state.
This chapter identifies if it is better to adopt policies that are adopted in a homophilous state or to
adopt policies depending on the industrial characteristics of the own state. From the findings of
the models, the results suggest states need more policies for the industries that they specialize in.
The state governments should adopt policies for their high LQ industries to increase economic
growth of the state. However, there is one problem of the LQ based measures and that is LQ is
measured based on spatial jurisdiction but clusters can essentially cross any administrative
boundary (Woodward 2012). So finer LQ data, say county level data, will potentially produce
more accurate estimates.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

States adopt economic development policies with the hope of increasing state economic
performance. However, in order for the policies to be effective, the state must consider various
policy dimensions of the adoptable policies. I find as past studies suggest that all policies do not
effectively contribute to the economic growth. Policies that are innovative contribute to
economic growth. Policies that are meant for the local economy and compatible with the local
characteristics can contribute to economy. That is, policies that are compatible with the industrial
characteristics of the local economy contribute to economic growth. Policies that assist the
community grow its entrepreneurship from within can also contribute to economic growth.
However, policies that are meant for recruiting out-of-state firms do not contribute to economic
growth of the local economy. In this study, I find that industrial recruitment incentives contribute
to leakage from the economy.
I test four hypotheses in this dissertation that reveal these findings. First, I test whether
innovativeness in program adoption contributes to economic growth. I hypothesize that no matter
the policy type, if it is an innovative one, it will contribute to economic growth (H1). My second
question is whether entrepreneurial policies contribute to economic growth. For this question, I
hypothesize that no matter how innovative the entrepreneurial policy is, it should contribute to
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economic growth (H2). Thirdly, I ask whether incentive-oriented policies contribute to leakage
from the economy to other locations. I hypothesize that incentive-oriented policies should
contribute to leakage from the economy (H3). Finally, my fourth question is whether the policies
that are compatible with the industrial characteristics of the home economy contribute to
economic growth. My fourth hypothesis is policies that are congruent to the industrial
characteristics of the economy should contribute to the economy.
For the first question, I use GDP and personal income as the dependent variables. I use
innovativeness as the main independent variable. Innovativeness is a measure for individual
programs in terms of the earliness in adopting a new program and the degree of diffusion of that
program within the economy. I examine whether innovativeness of program adoption contributes
to GDP growth and personal income growth. I compute innovativeness using a state’s experience
in operating specific types of programs and 1) the state’s yearly cumulative count of that type of
programs, and 2) the state’s yearly expenditure on that type of programs. I use these two
innovativeness measures once for all programs together without categorizing them and then with
two levels of categorization. At the first level, there are two types of programs: incentiveoriented and entrepreneurial. At the second level, there are three types of programs: two from the
incentive-oriented programs – tax incentives and business finance, and one from the
entrepreneurial programs – community finance. I find statistically significant evidence that the
count-based innovativeness of all programs, incentive-oriented, entrepreneurship oriented, tax
incentive, business finance, and community finance programs positively contribute to per capita
GDP and per capita personal income. That innovativeness of programs positively influences
economic growth also holds applying the ‘policy congruence’ variable as a control in the model
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(Please see Appendix Table A.4). In short, I find that innovativeness contributes to economic
growth.
However, for the innovativeness based on program spending, I do not always find
statistically significant estimates. Although the program count data and program spending data
come from the same source (The council for Community and Economic Research (C2ER)), these
are two separate datasets. There are some potential causes behind why I find different results for
using different datasets for my measures. First, I use cumulative count of programs from the
dataset that is a list of currently active programs (2,165 programs) in the states and territories. I
use their start year as the base to compute how long these programs have been active in the
states. I determine the number of programs that have been active in the states each year. I also
compute how much experience the states have with using a specific program. On the other hand,
for the spending data, I have yearly expenditures on the programs. There must be some programs
in the spending data that have not continued to a later year. So, when I use program experience to
compute innovativeness on spending data, the score potentially misses some programs. If I had
start year data associated with the program spending data, the results using the program spending
data could have been different. Secondly, in the count data, the program categories are
understandably separate from each other such as incentive-oriented, entrepreneurship, tax
incentives, business finance, community finance, etc. Although there are some programs that fall
under two categories as mentioned in the discussion of the dataset in Chapter 3. The spending
data, however, has a different scheme of categories, and the categories are such that many
categories may fall under both incentive and entrepreneurship-oriented programs. The basic
distinction between incentive-oriented and entrepreneurial programs that I use is incentive
programs are for private parties and entrepreneurship-oriented programs are for the community.
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But there are programs that can fall into either category depending on the way they are defined.
For example, funding for workforce development and preparation, I use this as an incentiveoriented program because this funding goes to firms. However, if the firm uses the money on the
workers for developing any transferable skills that they can use later at another local firm, this
funding can be regarded as entrepreneurial funding. Using a different scheme of categories may
produce different results of the estimates. I have an alternative scheme of categories and I present
the results based on that category in the Appendix (Table A.2).
For the second question, whether entrepreneurial programs contribute to economic
growth, I also use per capita GDP and personal income as dependent variables and a cumulative
count of entrepreneurial programs as the main independent variable. I find again statistically
significant estimates for the count-based measure and insignificant estimates for the spending
based measure. Although the spending-based measure has some issues as discussed in the last
paragraph, the count-based measure shows that entrepreneurial programs increase economic
growth. I find positive relationships for both per capita GDP and personal income.
For the third question, whether incentive-oriented programs increase leakage from the
economy, I use leakage as the dependent variable and a cumulative count of incentive-oriented
programs as the main independent variable. The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis calculates
State level leakage year to year, but they do not have time series data. I use their computational
approach to calculate leakage for the states over time using the same data sources (Bureau of
Labor Statistics) as they do. Leakage is the measure of how much each state spends for industrial
intermediate inputs from sources outside its own economy. I hypothesize that this leakage
increases if a state spends more to recruit firms from outside the state. I find statistically
significant estimates that incentive-oriented policies increase leakage.
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Finally, in order to test whether policies congruent to the industrial strength of a state has
a positive influence over its economy, I use the same per capita GDP and personal income
measures as dependent variables and a measure of policy congruence as the main independent
variable. In order to measure policy congruence, I use the C2ER program data, which records the
target industry for each program. I calculate whether the targeted industry is the strongest
industry of that state. To compute congruence, I apply how many programs are adopted for a
specific industry to what is the location quotient (the relative strength of an industry in the
country) of that industry for the state. I expect that economic growth should be higher if this
congruence score is higher. I find the results according to my expectation: congruent policies
contribute to economic growth for both GDP and personal income.
States adopt economic development policies to improve the performance of the
economy. A large portion of such policies is incentive-oriented policies. Scholars find that
incentive-oriented policies do not contribute to economic growth (Langer 2001; Leicht and
Jenkins 1994). In this dissertation, I build on these findings to see what other dimensions of
economic development policies may help explain economic performance. I find several key
dimensions of the policies that are beneficial to the economy and a few other dimensions that are
not. Entrepreneurial programs are beneficial to the economy. Incentive-oriented programs are
beneficial only under certain conditions. As the results suggest, incentive-oriented policies are
beneficial to the state’s economy, only if they are innovative and only if they are congruent to the
industrial strength of the state. The results also suggest that the states must be cautious in
adopting incentive-oriented policies as they cause leakage from the economy. The states should
target industries carefully when adopting incentive-oriented policies making sure they will use
more of the local resources than resources outside of the state. Finally, the results also suggest
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that the states need to keep adopting entrepreneurial policies that improve the local resources and
local capabilities so that firms can grow from within and reinvest the revenue they generate in a
way that eventually brings more revenue to the state.
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Table A.1: Economic development programs and business needs addressed in the American
states
Business needs addressed
Capital access or formation
Tax/Regulatory burden reduction
Workforce prep or development
Capital access or formation, Tax/Regulatory burden reduction
Capital access or formation, Facility/site location
Product & process improvement, Tax/Regulatory burden reduction
Facility/site location, Tax/Regulatory burden reduction
Infrastructure Improvement
Facility/site location
Workforce prep or development, Tax/Regulatory burden reduction
Tax/Regulatory burden reduction, Facility/site location
Tech & product development, Tax/Regulatory burden reduction
Capital access or formation, Infrastructure Improvement
Capital access or formation, Product & process improvement
Capital access or formation, Tech & product development
Tax/Regulatory burden reduction, Workforce prep or development
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Number of programs
400
388
98
69
60
57
55
49
37
37
36
36
32
28
25
2

Table A.2: An overview of spending on various economic development functions in the spending
dataset of C2ER
Economic
Development
programs
($223.7M)

Incentive-oriented
($136.0M)

Business finance ($0.22M)
Strategic business attraction fund (0)
Business assistance ($6.14M)
International trade and investment (0)
Domestic recruitment/out-of-state (0)
Workforce preparation and development ($11.77M)
Technology transfer ($0.55M)
Entrepreneurial development (0)
Tourism/film ($21.34M)
Special industry assistance ($16.76M)
Entrepreneurial
Workforce preparation and development ($11.77M)
($109.1M)
Entrepreneurial development (0)
Minority business development (0)
Community assistance ($25.44M)
Tourism/film ($21.34M)
Note. Figures in the parentheses indicate spending of the median state in 2020
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Table A.3: Regression for GDP and personal income on entrepreneurial programs for
entrepreneurial spending based on the categorization scheme in Table A.2
(Model 1)
Per capita GDP
Per capita spending on entrepreneurial
programs (-2)
Per capita federal funding on
transportation (-2)
Per capita state funding on higher
education (-2)
Per capita R&D expenditure in the
state (-2)
Waged and salaried employments per
thousands of population

4.26
(2.44)
0.27
(1.75)
2.61***
(0.80)
29.30
(47.42)
350.63***
(8.89)

State government ideology (-2)

-27.32*
(15.35)
Program spending (-2)* state
-0.11
ideology(-2)
(0.42)
Overall Intercept
-111050.0***
(4404.9)
Observations
450
Number of states
50
Adjusted R-squared
0.80
Significance codes: p<0.001 ‘***’ p<0.01 ‘**’ p<0.05 ‘*’
Standard errors in parentheses
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(Model 2)
Per capita Personal
Income
-2.88
(24.56)
1.97
(1.77)
1.17
(0.81)
148.98***
(47.84)
304.70***
(8.97)
-36.78**
(15.49)
-0.52
(0.43)
-95219.0***
(4443.4)
450
50
0.78

Table A.4: Linear regression for GDP and personal income on innovativeness and policy
congruence
(Model 1)
Per capita GDP
Innovativeness score as a factor of
program count (-2)
Policy congruence (employment) (-2)
Per capita federal funding on
transportation (-2)
Per capita state funding on higher
education (-2)
Per capita R&D expenditure in the
state (-2)
Waged and salaried employments per
thousands of population
State government ideology (-2)
Innovativeness (count) (-2)* state
ideology(-2)
Overall Intercept
Observations
Number of states
Adjusted R-squared

5.78***
(1.35)
59.36*
(31.03)
5.44
(3.67)
4.62***
(1.20)
281.39***
(78.01)
195.74***
(16.13)

(Model 2)
Per capita Personal
Income
5.64***
(1.11)
88.38***
(25.68)
10.93***
(3.04)
3.50***
(0.99)
254.16***
(64.56)
150.23***
(13.35)

-38.54
(31.15)
0.045**
(0.025)
-51992.0***
(7696.9)
283
48
0.75

-41.36
(26.39)
0.044**
(0.020)
-37818.0***
(6369.8)
283
48
0.79

Significance codes: p<0.001 ‘***’ p<0.01 ‘**’ p<0.05 ‘*’
Standard errors in parentheses
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Figure A.1: Third strongest industry in the American states (The circle markers indicate
respective LQ value)
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